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SUMMARY 
This dissertation is organized in three separate chapters. A common thread intertwined in the three of 
them is the role of informational flows at influencing individual´s choice. Chapter 1 provides novel 
empirical evidence on the role of imperfect information about price schedules on determining 
consumer’s demand choice for the residential gas market using a natural experiment and consumer 
microdata from the metropolitan region of Buenos Aires, Argentina. Based on the results a large field 
experiment carried out in a municipality of Argentina, Chapter 2 presents new empirical results 
showing that taxpayers are relatively insensitive to information on the prevailing level of tax evasion 
and the supply and quality of local public goods, whereas raising the salience of fines and other 
related penalties may have a large bearing on tax compliance. Relatedly, Chapter 3 presents novel 
evidence, also based on a field experiment conducted in another Argentine municipality, suggesting 
that informational treatments influence taxpayers’ beliefs about the risk of detection and the salience 
of penalties in the case of non-compliance, and hence, their compliance behaviour with respect to the 
tax code. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This dissertation is organized in three separate chapters. Chapter 1, co-authored with Dr. Carlos 
Scartascini, Dr. Julian Christia and Dr. Paulo Pastos, and accepted for publication at the Journal of 
Industrial Economics (JIE) (see Appendix 1: Supporting Documentation), applies semi-experimental 
methods to estimate the price elasticity of residential gas demand by applying a regression 
discontinuity design (RDD) to microdata of household consumption in the metropolitan area of 
Buenos Aires in Argentina. The chapter exploits the unique features of a recently introduced tariff 
schedule for natural gas in Buenos Aires to estimate the short-run impact of price shocks on 
residential energy utilization. The schedule induces a non-linear and non-monotonic relationship 
between households’ accumulated consumption and unit prices, thus generating exogenous price 
variation, which we exploit in a regression-discontinuity design. The results indicate that a price 
increase causes a prompt and significant decline in gas consumption. The results also indicate that 
consumers respond more to recent past bills than to expected prices, which argues against an 
assumption of perfect awareness of complex price schedules by consumers. 
Chapter 2, co-authored with Dr. Carlos Scartascini, explores the effects of informational 
flows on the individual taxpayer’s decision on whether or not complying with the tax code. It reports 
the results of a field experiment that tried to affect taxpayers’ compliance by affecting their beliefs 
regarding the levels of enforcement, equity, and fairness of the tax system. In the experiment, 
conducted in an Argentine municipality, taxpayers were divided in four groups; three of those groups 
received a specific treatment (a message on the tax bill). Results indicate that the most effective 
message was the one that stated the actual fines and potential legal consequences taxpayers may face 
in the case of non-compliance. Tax compliance among those taxpayers increased by more than 4 
percentage points (and this value may be underestimating the true impact). There are no average 
effects for the other treatments. However, the evidence also points out that not every taxpayer updates 
his or her beliefs in the same direction. This evidence may help to square off some of the opposing 
results in the literature. 
Chapter 3, using a similar approach to Chapter 2, investigates the importance of informational 
flows at influencing the two main determinants of the standard model of tax evasion developed by 
Allingham and Sandmo (1972) and Yistaki (1974). I carried out a large field experiment in another 
municipality of Argentina that consisted in sending messages to the entire population of taxpayers of a 
local property tax aimed at influencing their subjective beliefs about the probability of enforcement of 
the tax code and the potential economic and legal consequences of tax cheating. In the experiment, I 
randomly divided the population of taxpayers in four groups. Three groups received specific 
treatments: a penalty-based message, a monitoring-based letter, or both. The empirical results indicate 
that these instruments may not be substitutes (or that at least, that the underlying elasticities are 
different). While the penalty-based message had a positive and significant effect (tax compliance for 
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those taxpayers increased by around 3 percentage points with respect to the control group) I do not 
find significant average treatment effects for the monitoring-based letter. The average effect for those 
taxpayers that received both treatments is statistically similar to the group that received only the 
penalty-based message. I find even larger effects for non-compliant taxpayers with multiple 
properties.  
A common thread that entwines the three chapters is the empirical analysis of the importance 
of informational flows at influencing individual choice. Chapter 1 provides semi-experimental 
evidence on the role of imperfect information about price schedules on determining consumer’s 
demand choice in the residential gas market. Based on a large field experiment, Chapter 2, in turn, 
suggests that taxpayers are relatively insensitive to information on the prevailing level of tax evasion 
and the supply and quality of local public goods, whereas raising the salience of fines and other 
related penalties may have a large bearing of tax compliance. Relatedly, Chapter 3 shows, based also 
on a randomized field experiment, that informational treatments might influence differentially 
taxpayer’s subjective perceptions about the risk of detection and the salience of penalties, and hence, 
her compliance decision with respect to the tax code.  
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CHAPTER 1. Does energy consumption respond to price shocks? Evidence 
from a regression-discontinuity design 
 
1.1. Introduction 
Suppose that energy prices experience a shock. Does energy consumption respond? How much and 
how promptly? These are key questions in the study of a wide range of macroeconomic, regulatory 
and environmental issues, such as the transmission channels of energy price shocks, optimal taxation 
and pricing policies in energy markets, and interventions to address climate change. Naturally, 
economists have a long-standing interest in estimating consumption responses to price changes in 
energy markets.
1
 Progress towards this aim has been complicated by an important identification 
challenge, however. Since consumers typically experience the same events at essentially the same 
time, it has been difficult to construct the equivalent of randomly assigned treatment and control 
groups and thereby ground the estimated price-elasticities on a well-defined counterfactual (Reiss and 
White, 2008). 
In this chapter, we exploit unique features of a recently introduced tariff schedule for 
residential natural gas in Greater Buenos Aires to estimate the short-run impact of price shocks on 
residential gas utilization.
2
 The revised schedule induces a non-linear and non-monotonic relationship 
between annual previously accumulated consumption and unit prices, thus giving rise to exogenous 
price variation. In particular, the introduction of a threshold for defining unit prices based on 
previously accumulated consumption approximates a randomly assigned price differential for a large 
number of consumers on each side the threshold, allowing us to build treatment and control groups to 
estimate the impact of interest. We estimate the demand effect of a price shock using a regression 
discontinuity (RD) design whereby the gas consumption levels of households situated barely above 
the tariff discontinuity are compared with those of households located barely below. 
We implement the RD design on administrative records of the natural gas distribution 
company, gathering longitudinal data on the unit prices and consumption levels of each consumer 
located near the tariff discontinuity–the same information that these households received in their 
utility bills. We find that an increase in the average price of natural gas in the utility bill received by 
consumers induces a statistically significant and prompt decline in residential gas utilization: a 25% 
price increase reduced residential gas consumption by 3.8% in the subsequent two-month period. This 
                                                          
1 Research on this topic, discussed in more detail below, dates to Parti and Parti (1980), Dubin and McFadden (1984) and Hsiao and 
Mountain (1985). Recent influential contributions include Reiss and White (2005, 2008). 
2 Greater Buenos Aires (Gran Buenos Aires) is an urban metropolitan area that comprises the city of Buenos Aires and 24 adjacent 
municipalities (National Institute of Statistics and Censuses, 2003). According to the 2010 population census it has 12.8 million inhabitants, 
nearly a third of the total Argentinean population. 
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result suggests that policy interventions via the price mechanism may constitute a powerful instrument 
to influence the patterns of residential energy utilization, even in a relatively short time span.
3
 
An important feature of our research design is that it exploits the specific information set 
available to consumers to estimate the effect of interest. In particular, because households are 
reclassified every billing period on the basis of their annual accumulated consumption, fully informed 
consumers in the treatment and control group face the same expected prices moving forward. 
However, we provide survey evidence suggesting that consumers have highly imperfect knowledge 
about the price determination mechanism, and appear to infer prices from recent past bills. In 
addition, we offer strong statistical evidence that consumers do not manipulate strategically their 
annual accumulated consumption. For these reasons, the resulting estimates are especially relevant for 
residential energy markets characterized by ex-post billing where households infer changes in prices 
from the utility bill. Importantly, while it has long been emphasized that this feature of residential 
energy markets plays an important role in shaping consumption responses to price changes (Shin, 
1985), there is still little direct evidence on whether and how promptly energy consumption responds 
to price variations inferred from utility bills. 
We complement and extend several strands of literature. A number of studies on the price-
elasticity of energy demand employ time series methods using data on energy prices and aggregate 
energy consumption (Liu and Lin, 1991; Krichene, 2002; Bushnell and Mansur, 2005; Fezzi and 
Bunn, 2010). A related body of work draws on cross-sectional survey data, including influential 
papers by Parti and Parti (1980), Dubin and McFadden (1984), Dubin (1985) and Reiss and White 
(2005). While these methods allow for the estimation of long-term impacts, the aggregated or cross-
sectional nature of the data imposes relatively strong identifying assumptions. Furthermore, estimates 
yielded by cross-sectional data are, by construction, silent on the speed with which energy 
consumption adjusts to price shocks, an issue that is of key interest in a variety of policy contexts. 
Another strand of research estimates price-elasticities in the context of tariff field 
experiments, including early work by Hausman, Kinnucan and McFadden (1979), Acton and Mitchell 
(1980), Caves and Christensen (1980) and Parks and Weitzel (1984). Whereas this approach addresses 
some limitations of the time-series and cross-sectional evidence, it has been criticized on the ground 
that the (most often voluntarily-selected) set of participants are thoroughly informed about price 
changes at the outset, generating an informational context that differs significantly from real-world 
situations in which households learn about price changes from utility bills or the press (Acton, 1982; 
Reiss and White, 2008). 
                                                          
3 The evidence we provide may therefore contribute to the discussion on the relative importance of prices versus nudges for steering 
consumers’ behaviors (Loewenstein and Ubel, 2010). 
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Two recent papers using disaggregate billing data on electricity consumption from California 
are perhaps the closest to our own. Reiss and White (2008) examine how price shocks and 
conservation appeals impact residential electricity consumption. Their estimates point to sizable short-
run impacts on energy utilization. In independent work, Ito (2010) exploits a spatial discontinuity in 
electric utility service areas in southern California, which leads to nearly identical households 
experiencing different nonlinear price schedules. His contribution is highly complementary to ours. 
Consistent with our results for the natural gas market, he finds that residential consumers in the 
electricity market respond to (lagged) average price, rather than marginal or expected marginal price
.4
,
5 
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 provides background 
information on the market for natural gas in Greater Buenos Aires and describes the data employed. 
Section 3 describes the research design and provides important complementary evidence from a 
survey of consumers located near the tariff discontinuity of interest. Section 4 presents the 
econometric results. Section 5 provides a discussion of the results in the context of the literature. 
Section 6 offers some concluding remarks. 
1.2. Background and data 
We focus on the residential market for natural gas in Greater Buenos Aires. In late 2008, the national 
energy regulatory agency (ENARGAS) introduced the first increase in residential gas tariff since 
2002. The revised schedule was composed of eight new tariff groups, each facing different variable 
fees per cubic meter; see Table 1. This schedule introduced significantly higher unit prices for those 
consumers with higher levels of annual accumulated consumption. We exploit the resulting 
discontinuity in variable prices at the annual consumption level that divides categories R32 and R33 
to examine consumption responses to price shocks. 
Our empirical analysis draws on administrative records from MetroGAS S.A., one of the 
largest residential gas distributors in Argentina. The company has a client base in Greater Buenos 
Aires of about 2.5 million residential households, who receive their gas bills every two months. The 
administration of MetroGAS agreed to provide us with data on a small share of its customer base 
around the discontinuity R32-R33.
6 
Given this constraint, we have defined the sample with the view to 
optimize the implementation of the RD design for this discontinuity. Specifically, consumers were 
                                                          
4 Focusing on the gas market in the US, Davis and Muehlegger (2010) exploit variation in wholesale prices to estimate the price elasticity of 
demand in the residential sector. We believe that our RD estimates add value to this literature in that they: (1) are less likely to be affected 
by unobserved heterogeneity across households; and (2) emphasize the role of imperfect information in shaping consumer behavior in this 
market. 
5 See also Jessoe and Rapson (2011) for a recent analysis of commercial and industrial demand response under mandatory time-of-use 
electricity pricing in Connecticut. 
6 To preserve confidentiality of its broad customer base, the company refused to provide us with data on consumers from other categories. 
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selected into the sample provided by the company if: (i) they had a residential bill issued in May 2009 
with an annual accumulated consumption between 1480 and 1520 cubic meters; and (ii) they had been 
customers for at least six bimonthly cycles by that month. The resulting estimation sample contains 
7190 households. 
This sample is composed of longitudinal records corresponding to the bills issued in May 
2009, in the five previous bimonthly periods, and in the three subsequent ones. For each period, the 
data set comprises information on the amount billed, quantity of gas consumed (in cubic meters), type 
of reading (measured or imputed), category assigned to the consumer, and the exact dates of reading 
and issuance. It further contains information on the region and neighborhood of residence of each 
consumer. 
1.3. Research design 
An ideal experiment designed to estimate the impact of a price shock on residential energy 
consumption would randomly assign some consumers to a treatment group, facing price H
P
, and 
other consumers to a control group, facing price L
P
. Unfortunately, a large-scale experiment of this 
kind has yet to be implemented, making the task of estimating this behavioral response rather 
difficult. To approximate such an ideal experiment, we exploit unique features of the price schedule 
described in section 1.2, along with the specific information set available to consumers. 
In May 2009, households with annual accumulated consumption above 1500 cubic meters 
were assigned a unit price roughly 25% higher than those with an annual accumulated consumption 
barely below this level. This discontinuity of the unit price schedule makes it possible to apply a RD 
design in which the outcome variable corresponds to the consumption level in the subsequent two-
month period and the running variable to the annual accumulated consumption. 
However, as we explain in detail below, the interpretation of the RD design in this application 
is made difficult by two important features of the price determination mechanism: (i) the category to 
which consumers are assigned to, and hence the unit price they are charged, is determined by the 
accumulated consumption of the previous 12 months; and (ii) the categorization of consumers is 
revised every two months, in line with the variation of the 12-month accumulated consumption over 
that period. 
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1.3.1. The price determination mechanism 
Let us define the key variables underlying the determination of the amount billed in a given bimonthly 
period 0. The annual accumulated consumption 0
AAC
 corresponds to the sum of the consumption 
level C  in period 0 and in the five previous bimonthly periods: 
j
j
CAAC 

0
5=
0 =
      (1) 
The unit price in period 0 is a function of whether accumulated consumption is above or 
below a given threshold
:7 


 
1500>if
1500if
=
0
0
0
AACP
AACP
P
H
L
     (2) 
The total bill B  in period 0 can be expressed as: 
 0000
=  CPFCB
      (3) 
where FC  is a fixed cost, 0
P
 is the unit price in that period, and 0

 is an idiosyncratic shock 
capturing the fact that the bill received by consumers sometimes contains idiosyncratic adjustments 
and retroactive charges (e.g., taxes and other charges defined by the regulator on a rather ad hoc 
manner). 
Finally, while consumers may target consumption levels in the following period, they are 
unable to perfectly control their gas consumption patterns. Hence, actual consumption will differ from 
targeted consumption ( CT ) by a random shock. That is: 
 111
= eCTC 
      (4) 
In our setting, Period 0 corresponds to that billed in May 2009. Consumers in the treatment 
group are those with annual accumulated consumption barely above 1500 cubic meters in period 0, 
while consumers in the control group are those with annual accumulated consumption barely below 
this level. Whether or not we would expect this price shock to have a differential impact on gas 
consumption in period 1 crucially depends on the specific information set held by consumers. 
Since households are reclassified every period on the basis of their annual accumulated 
consumption, fully informed consumers in the treatment and control group face the same expected 
price moving forward. Hence, if perfectly informed, both groups would have essentially the same 
                                                          
7 For simplicity, in this section we focus on consumers with annual accumulated consumption between 1,251 and 1,800 cubic meters who 
can therefore face only two potential prices (see Table 1). 
-16- 
 
 
 
incentive to restrain consumption so as not to surpass the 1500 cubic meters threshold in period 1, 
despite the fact that the bill received in period 0 contained sharp differences in unit prices. However, 
in the light of the well-documented prominence of information imperfections in residential energy 
markets with ex-post billing (Shin, 1985), and considering the complexity and novelty of the price 
determination mechanism in the residential market for natural gas of Greater Buenos Aires, we would 
expect consumers to be imperfectly informed. To provide further evidence on the information set held 
by consumers, we have surveyed a subset of households in the estimation sample. 
1.3.2. Survey evidence on consumers located near the discontinuity 
We have administered a telephone survey to 353 households from the estimation sample. The sub-
sample surveyed was stratified by district to ensure an adequate geographical representation. The 
survey was conducted in September 2010 and targeted the member of the household that was 
responsible for paying the gas bill.
8
 
The survey questionnaire consists of two sections. The first section collected information on 
basic socioeconomic characteristics of the household head (age, education, occupation) and housing 
conditions. The second section explored knowledge about the amount billed and payment method, and 
assessed the extent to which consumers read their utility bills. In addition, this section collected 
extensive information on perceived and objective knowledge on how the amount billed is computed; 
specifically, on: (i) how frequently tariffs are determined; (ii) the past consumption periods used for 
their determination; and (iii) the consumption threshold that leads to a higher unit price. 
Table 2 reports summary statistics on the member of the household surveyed. For 
comparison, it also provides summary statistics from the national Household Survey (Encuesta 
Permanente de Hogares) on households living in Greater Buenos Aires. Relative to the average 
resident, surveyed household members from our estimation sample are more likely to be female and 
married. They are also more likely to have tertiary education, and tend to be considerably older than 
the average resident. These differences are likely to reflect the fact that the survey targeted the 
household member that was responsible for paying the gas bill. The fact that surveyed households are 
more likely to have tertiary education might also suggest that they tend to have higher-than-average 
income. Table 2 further suggests that surveyed households are more likely to be homeowners, and 
have a slightly larger number of rooms and families. This evidence is consistent with the fact that our 
estimation sample focuses on households of relatively high gas consumption. Further data from the 
questionnaire suggests that natural gas is the dominant source of energy used by these households: 
                                                          
8 The survey used records from 2952 households in order to obtain 353 valid responses from the member of the household that is responsible 
for paying the gas bills. A failure to produce a valid interview occurred when the enumerator: (i) was unable to establish a phone 
conversation with any member of the household; (ii) was unable to reach the person responsible for paying the gas bills; or (iii) the person 
responsible for paying the gas bills refused to cooperate. The response rate of the survey (12%) is well in line with that of recent phone 
surveys in the US a recent study by the Pew Research Center (2012) reports that a standard survey yields a response rate of 9%. 
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76.1% of households use it for space heating, 95.2% use it for water heating, and 99.4% use it for 
cooking. 
Table 3 reports the key results from the survey.
9
 Nearly 92% of households reported that they 
were able to remember the amount charged in the last gas bill. The proportion of households who paid 
their bill by direct debit is relatively small (14%), which alleviates the concern that consumers might 
not be aware of how much they are charged every period. About 75% of consumers stated that they 
regularly read their gas bills. 
However, knowledge about the price determination mechanism proved to be almost non-
existent. Among surveyed households, 31% stated that they know how the price is determined. 
However, the questions aimed at assessing precise knowledge of the price determination mechanism 
suggest that the proportion of well-informed consumers is considerably lower. First, only 14% of 
households knew that consumers are re-categorized (and unit prices are determined) in each billing 
cycle. Second, 39% of consumers knew that their billing category is determined on the basis of the 
accumulated consumption over the previous year. Third, only 4% of consumers knew that the 
threshold that divides categories R32 and R33 is 1,500 cubic meters. Overall, less than 1% of 
households provided correct answers to the three objective questions posed. 
In summary, the survey reveals that consumers tend to know how much they are paying for 
their gas consumption, but have scant information about the actual pricing scheme. Consequently, in 
the remainder of this chapter, we will assume that the vast majority of consumers have imperfect 
information about the prevailing price determination mechanism and infer prices from the utility bill. 
1.4.  Econometric model 
Under the assumption that most if not all consumers have imperfect information about the price 
determination mechanism, we can estimate the short-term effects of price shocks by applying a sharp 
RD design. That is, we can compare gas utilization in period 1 for consumers that in period 0 had 
annual accumulated consumption barely above and below the 1500 cubic meters threshold, as both 
these sets of consumers are expected to be very similar along observed and unobserved characteristics 
but experienced very different unit prices. Since we can reasonably assume that households infer 
prices from recent past bills, differences in consumption in period 1 across both groups of consumers 
can be interpreted as the short-run behavioural response to the price shock. 
To implement the RD design we estimate the following regression model: 
,0,0,010,1 )(= iiii AACfTreatmentC       (5) 
                                                          
9 The full set of results is available upon request. 
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where ,1i
C
 corresponds to consumption in period 1 for consumer i. ,0iAAC  corresponds to the 
running variable, the normalized annual accumulated consumption in period 0. That is: 
 
1500= ,0,0 ii AACAAC      (6) 
The treatment variable is a binary indicator of whether individual i  in period 0  was assigned 
the higher unit price. It is determined as: 
 

 
0>if1
0if0
=
0
0
,0
AAC
AAC
Treatment i
     (7) 
Parameter 1

 in (5) captures the average effect of barely surpassing the threshold, and hence 
having received a substantially larger utility bill, once we flexibly control for the running variable, 
0AAC . The intuition behind this approach is that all observable and unobservable variables should 
evolve smoothly around this threshold, and hence any jump in consumption in period 1 can be 
attributed to the discontinuous increase in the amount billed. In other words, in a valid RD design, a 
key assumption is that observations are randomly distributed between the treatment and control group 
in a local neighbourhood of the threshold (Lee and Lemieux, 2010). In our setting, this assumption 
seems plausible for three reasons. First, as documented above, consumers have highly imperfect 
knowledge about the price determination mechanism. Second, they tend to be unaware of the location 
of the relevant threshold. Third, even if they had perfect information about the pricing scheme, it 
would be difficult and time-consuming – if at all possible – to precisely manipulate gas utilization so 
as to avoid passing this cutoff. Indeed, this would require obtaining access to gas readings, forecasting 
factors affecting future demand, and knowing exactly when the billing period ends (i.e. the exact 
timing of the meter reading). 
We focus on behavioural reactions during the period of mid-May to mid-July 2009, as these 
two winter months account for the bulk of annual gas consumption (about 30% of the total). It would 
have been possible to examine consumption patterns of these households in later billing cycles. 
However, beginning in June 2009, public reactions motivated by the increase in gas prices generated a 
disruption in the normal billing process of the company. This generated differences in the timing of 
bill issuance for individuals on both sides of the cutoff, making it difficult to disentangle between 
timing effects and those stemming from the price shock. 
Though we would like to compare observations just above and below the threshold, in 
practice a larger window around the cutoff has to be used to obtain precise estimates. In choosing the 
width of this window, researchers typically face a trade-off between bias and precision: a wider 
window provides greater precision but at the expense of expected higher bias. In our setting, because 
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the utility company had records on almost two million consumers, we were able to select a narrow 
window around the threshold and still have a sizable sample size of 7200 consumers. 
Our baseline specification consists of a local linear regression that controls for normalized 
annual accumulated consumption as expressed in (6). Although in general it is recommended to 
control for the running variable to minimize the potential bias (Imbens and Lemieux, 2008), in this 
particular application the close relationship between the outcome and the running variable justifies 
following this approach. For robustness, we additionally report estimates: (i) reducing the window in 
the running variable used to select consumers; (ii) controlling for higher order polynomials of the 
running variable; and (iii) allowing for a differential slope between the outcome and the running 
variable on both sides of the cutoff. 
We cluster standard errors by the running variable, as suggested by Lee and Card (2008) for 
cases in which this variable is discrete.
10 
It has been pointed out that when the number of clusters is 
small, standard errors may be downward biased (Angrist and Lavy, 2009). In our baseline 
specification, there are 41 clusters which may be a large enough number (Cameron, Gelbach and 
Miller, 2008). Nonetheless, this problem becomes more serious when the number of clusters is 
reduced, as a narrower window in the running variable is used. However, the results are robust to two 
proposed solutions to this problem: (i) computing averages of the relevant variables by clusters and 
reproducing the analysis at this level; and (ii) selecting the highest between robust-clustered and 
conventional standard errors (Angrist and Pischke, 2008). 
1.5. Results 
1.5.1.  Testing the validity of the research design 
The basic identifying assumption of RD design is that the outcome variable would have been 
continuous at the assignment threshold in the absence of the treatment (Lee, 2008). Albeit this 
assumption cannot be tested directly, we provide evidence on this issue by examining whether a 
number of covariates are continuous at the threshold. We define a treatment group composed of 
consumers in the (1,20) cubic meters of normalized annual accumulated consumption by May 2009 
and a corresponding control group for those in the (-20,0) cubic meters range. Given that a small 
bandwidth is used to select these two groups of consumers, differences in the running variable 
between them are minimal, as the average difference in this variable is only 20 cubic meters – which 
represent only 1.3% of the mean (20/1500). Hence, as a first approximation it is possible to compare 
average values between the treatment and control groups to inspect for evidence in favour of the 
identifying assumption. We additionally run local linear regressions to test for the existence of jumps 
                                                          
10 Measured consumption is always rounded to the nearest integer, and hence we cluster the standard errors at the unit levels of the running 
variable. 
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in covariates at the threshold once we control for differences in normalized annual accumulated 
consumption. 
Table 4 presents results for key dates and period lengths. Panel A shows that the timing of 
events is very similar between the treatment and control groups, while Panels B and C document that 
the length of critical periods is almost identical across groups. Similar patterns emerge when we test 
for jumps in these variables, by regressing them on the treatment dummy while controlling for the 
normalized annual accumulated consumption in period 0 (Column 4). Results not reported (but 
available on request) show that there are significant differences between the analysed dates and period 
lengths across regions, suggesting the relevance of exploring balance in timing patterns. Inspecting 
balancing in period lengths for Period 1 is critical to attribute differences in total consumption during 
that period to changes in consumer behaviour. The results provide evidence that actual gas 
consumption is recorded every two months. Hence consumption reported in the administrative records 
corresponds to actual consumption and not to imputations by the firm. Moreover, gas bills are issued 
approximately one week after the final measurement for the period and should be received by 
consumers approximately 10 days after a period ended, according to the firm. This leaves about 50 
days for consumers to react. 
In Table 5 we examine differences in the geographic distribution across groups. Though in 
general the results point to adequate balancing along this dimension, in 4 out of 10 regions statistical 
differences at the 10% level are found when comparing the treatment and control groups. However, 
the results show that only in one case there are statistical differences at the 10% level once we control 
linearly for normalized annual accumulated consumption (adjusted difference column). 
In Table 6 we analyse differences in historical consumption patterns. Panel A presents raw 
and adjusted differences between consumption in periods -5 to 0. By construction, the annual 
accumulated consumption of the treatment group will be higher than that of the control group. Hence 
the existence of some statistically significant differences when analysing raw differences is not 
surprising. Though expected, these findings highlight the importance of adjusting for the running 
variable. When doing this, we tend not to observe statistically significant differences across groups. 
Panel B presents a more clean test of pre-treatment differences between groups by comparing 
consumption in each period as a share of the total annual consumption. In this dimension, the 
treatment and control groups present strikingly similar patterns, suggesting once more that the RD 
design is able to yield unbiased estimates in this context. 
Figures 1 to 3 depict the results presented in Tables 4 to 6. The same patterns highlighted in 
the tables clearly stand out from these figures: the covariates considered are smooth around the 
discontinuity. Importantly, Table 7 and Figure 4 clearly show that the average amount billed in period 
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0 slightly increases as normalized annual accumulated consumption raises but jumps drastically when 
the latter crosses the cutoff.
11
 
It has been stressed in the RD design literature that this approach will not be suitable if agents 
can manipulate the running variable, implying that the condition that individuals on both sides of the 
discontinuity are similar is not fulfilled (McCrary, 2008; Lee and Lemieux, 2010). For the reasons 
outlined above, we would expect the scope for this manipulation to be limited in our setting. 
Nevertheless, to explore this issue further we follow McCrary (2008) and examine the density 
distribution of the running variable, in particular whether there is a jump in this density around the 
threshold. Figure 5 shows that the density is quite flat and does not point to the existence of any 
discontinuity around the threshold. 
1.6.  Estimating the short-run impacts of the price shock 
1.6.1.  Main results 
Given the evidence confirming the validity of the research design, we now turn to the primary focus 
of this chapter: the impact of the price shock on gas consumption in the subsequent billing period. 
Table 8 presents the results. In specification (1), we regress gas consumption in period 1 on the 
treatment dummy, while controlling linearly for normalized annual accumulated consumption. The 
results reveal that experiencing a price shock induces a statistically significant drop in gas 
consumption of 15.9 cubic meters in the subsequent period (or roughly 3.8% of the average gas 
consumption).  Figure 6 depicts these results. There is a clear positive relationship between 
consumption in period 1 and normalized annual accumulated consumption in period 0, as would be 
expected given that consumers with higher consumption in the past also tend to consume more in the 
future. But, most importantly, gas consumption seems to fall discontinuously at the threshold, 
suggesting that households react to the price shock by significantly reducing consumption in the 
subsequent two-month period. The estimated effect is sizable if considering that, given the short time 
span, it is unlikely that consumers will adjust to the new price via investments in more efficient 
appliances or improvements in insulation. Moreover, since consumers typically learn about the new 
price approximately 10 days after the beginning of the period, they have only about 50 out of 
approximately 60 days to adjust to the price shock. 
Results from other specifications show that these estimates are quite robust. In specifications 
(3), (5) and (7) the control function becomes progressively more flexible as we add second, third and 
fourth order terms. The estimated coefficient remains remarkably stable, hovering between 15.2 and 
16.5. In all cases, the results are statistically significant at least at the 10% level, although as expected 
                                                          
11 To verify if the amount billed in period 0 actually followed the tariff structure prevailing at the time, we have predicted the bill by 
applying the prevailing unit prices, adding the fixed charge and applying the minimum billed amount. The correlation between predicted and 
actual bills is 0.98, suggesting that the firms bills in period 0 followed closely the prevailing price schedule. 
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the standard errors are larger in more flexible specifications. The remaining columns present the 
corresponding estimates when allowing for differential shapes of the control function at both sides of 
the cutoff. Once again, the estimated coefficient remains robust, although its precision falls markedly 
in more flexible specifications. 
Table 9 presents further evidence on the robustness of the results as we use an increasingly 
narrow bandwidth, thus restricting our attention to observations progressively closer to the threshold. 
Although the coefficients become less precisely estimated when restricting to observations located 
closer to the cutoff, the estimated impact remains virtually unchanged. Table 1 in the Appendix 2 
further shows that the estimated impacts are robust to the inclusion of neighbourhood fixed-effects. 
1.6.2.  Alternative hypotheses 
In addition to the issues addressed in the previous section, a potential threat to the validity of our 
estimates is that they might be partially driven by mean reversion. If gas consumption does not follow 
a random walk, households who experience a positive demand shock in period 0 might be expected to 
reduce consumption in period 1 relative to identical households with a negative or zero consumption 
variation in period 0.
12
 To account for this hypothesis, in Table 10 we examine differential 
consumption patterns in period 1 for consumers located just above and just below two placebo AAC 
thresholds (where consumers did not experience a price shock). If negative serial correlation were to 
explain our estimates, we would expect to observe significant differentials in consumption patterns 
around other AAC thresholds. But the estimates in Table 10 show that this is not the case. We find no 
differential consumption patterns across consumers located just above and just below such fake 
thresholds, while we do confirm the results relative to the threshold of interest. 
As mentioned above, an important concern about our analysis is that the estimated treatment 
effects might partially reflect strategic behaviour of households in the treatment group. In particular, 
rather than just reacting to the price shock, these households might have an incentive to reduce 
consumption in order to fall below the threshold of interest in the subsequent billing period. Under 
this alternative scenario, those consumers in the treatment group that are located just above the 
threshold should be expected to reduce consumption by less than those consumers in the treatment 
group located that are farther away from the threshold. To examine this hypothesis, we divide the 
treatment group into two different sets of consumers: a "Close" group, including those consumers 
with AAC in period 0 between 1501 and 1510 cubic meters; and a “ Far” group encompassing those 
consumers with AAC in the 1511 to 1520 interval. The control group continues to be composed of 
consumers with AAC in Period 0 between 1480 and 1500 cubic meters. To fall below the thresholds 
of interest, individuals in the "Close" group need to reduce their consumption in Period 1 (compared 
                                                          
12 For example, if a household receives a guest in period 0 gas demand would like increase in that period, returning to normal levels in 
period 1 once the guest leaves. 
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to Period 0) by 5 cubic meters, whereas those in the "Far" group need to reduce it by 15 cubic meters, 
on average. If consumers in the treatment group were to behave strategically, both the "Close" and 
"Far" groups would be expected to reduce consumption in Period 1, but the latter group would be 
expected to reduce it by 10 cubic meters more on average. Alternatively, if consumption responses 
were mainly driven by the fact that all consumers in the treatment group experienced a price shock, 
both the "Close" and "Far" groups would be expected to decrease consumption by a similar amount. 
To distinguish between these alternative hypotheses, we estimate an equation of the form: 
,0,0,02,010,1 )(= iiiii AACfFarCloseC      (8) 
where ,0i
Close
 and ,0i
Far
 have the meaning described above. Table 11 documents that the reduction 
in consumption for the "Close" and "Far" groups, as compared to the control group, is very similar (-
16.3 versus -18.5) providing little support to the hypothesis that consumption responses are motivated 
by strategic behaviour. 
1.7. Discussion 
While the quasi-experimental setting we adopt provides unique features for examining short-run 
consumption responses to price shocks, some caution is needed in extrapolating to other situations. 
An important drawback of the RD design is that the results are local, in that they refer to the particular 
threshold studied, and may not generalize to the other points in the distribution of the running 
variable. This caveat applies to the present analysis. In the specific market we study, consumers with 
annual accumulated consumption around the 1500 cubic meters threshold have above-the-average gas 
consumption. The extent to which the results generalize to other consumers is an open question. 
Households with lower levels of annualized consumption may present higher price sensitivity, if they 
are lower-income consumers and, therefore, more price-conscious. On the other hand, these 
consumers may be less sensitive to price changes, as lower baseline gas utilization may signal a low 
weight of this good in their overall consumption basket. Nevertheless, the study of price sensitivity for 
high-consumption households may be interesting in its own right, as they account for a sizable share 
of overall gas consumption. 
A second limitation of our analysis is that the estimated impact refers to the consumption 
response to a positive price shock. It is difficult to assess the extent to which the results would 
generalize to policy interventions inducing a fall in the price faced by consumers – e.g. binding price 
caps and subsidies. Indeed, existing research suggests that consumers react differently to price 
increases and decreases (see, e.g. Dargay, 1993). 
A third caveat of our study is that, while the tariff schedule we exploit offers a unique ground 
for examining consumption responses to price shocks, caution is needed in extrapolating our estimates 
to other price schemes. Upon exceeding the 1500 cubic meter threshold, households face both a 
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discontinuous price shock and an increase in the marginal cost of each additional unit consumed. 
Furthermore, as discussed above, perfectly informed consumers could reverse this discontinuous 
shock on future bills with a small decrease in consumption. It is important to emphasize that this 
setting differs clearly from graduated price schemes, where consumers face a higher marginal cost for 
all consumption above a threshold but a lower rate for consumption below the threshold. Our 
estimates are potentially more informative on how consumers might be expected to respond to an 
across-the-board rate increase, in which the price of all units of gas (marginal and inframarginal) 
increases. However, valid extrapolation to those situations hinges on households believing that their 
efforts to reduce consumption have only a marginal effect, as opposed to a discontinuous effect, on 
subsequent bills. Although the evidence we provide suggests that consumers are generally unaware of 
(or do not understand well) the threshold, and also that they do not manipulate strategically their gas 
consumption around it, we cannot exclude the possibility that (some) households realize that a 
marginal effort to reduce consumption might reduce discontinuously their subsequent gas bill. 
With these caveats in mind, this chapter offers solid evidence that prices do matter for energy 
consumption in energy markets, even over short-run durations. As Reiss and White (2008, pp.654) 
emphasize, this fact is important as it has not been widely recognized by policy makers, in part due to 
the absence of clear and unambiguous evidence of such behaviour. It is therefore interesting to 
compare our estimates to those obtained in recent research on consumption responses to price changes 
in energy markets. At about -0.15, the short-run estimated elasticity we report is in line with recent 
estimates for the natural gas market. Drawing on state-level panel data for the US, Bernstein and 
Griffin (2006) estimate a short-run elasticity estimate of -0.12. Also for the US, but using 
disaggregated panel data at the customer level in an instrumental variables approach, Davis and 
Muehlegger (2010) report an estimated price elasticity of demand of -0.28. Our estimates are also 
similar to those of recent studies using disaggregated data for the residential electricity market in 
California. Focusing on San Diego households, Reiss and White (2008) find that a price increase of 
130% induced a consumption decline of 13% in about 60 days. Ito (2010) exploits a spatial 
discontinuity in service areas in southern California, which leads to nearly identical households 
experiencing different nonlinear price schedules, and estimates a short-run elasticity with respect to 
lagged average prices of -0.11.
13
 
Another important conclusion from our analysis is that the way in which customers process 
information about complex tariff structures is an important driver of their behaviour. Indeed, we 
provide survey evidence that consumers have highly imperfect knowledge about the price 
determination mechanism, and appear to infer prices from past utility bills. In addition, we offer 
strong statistical evidence that households do not manipulate strategically their gas consumption 
                                                          
13 Reiss and White (2008) survey earlier literature using cross-sectional survey data for household electricity consumption, and conclude that 
the cross-sectional estimates vary widely, with typical values near -0.3. 
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around the relevant threshold, despite strong incentives for doing so under the prevailing price 
determination mechanism. The evidence we provide is therefore especially relevant for residential 
energy markets characterized by complex tariff structures and ex-post billing. While it has long been 
stressed that imperfect information in residential energy markets plays an important role in shaping 
consumption responses to price changes (Shin, 1985), there is still little direct evidence on consumer 
behaviour in the presence of complex price schedules and ex-post billing. In this regard, our findings 
are consistent with (and complementary to) those of recent studies by Bushnell and Mansur (2005) 
and Ito (2010). Examining the electricity market in San Diego, Bushnell and Mansur (2005) provide 
evidence that customers respond more to out-dated prices from their last bill than to current market 
conditions. Ito (2010) finds that consumers respond to lagged average prices rather than marginal or 
expected marginal prices when faced with nonlinear electricity price schedules. Taken together this 
evidence suggest that, in order to precisely estimate the impacts of complex price schedules on energy 
utilization, policy makers and regulators need to move beyond the assumption of perfect awareness of 
such schedules by consumers. 
 
1.8.  Concluding remarks 
We have exploited unique features of the tariff schedule for natural gas in Greater Buenos Aires, 
along with survey evidence on the specific information set possessed by consumers, to estimate the 
short-run effect of price shocks on residential gas consumption. The revised tariff schedule induced a 
non-linear and non-monotonic relationship between annual accumulated consumption and unit prices, 
thus generating exogenous price variation. Drawing on administrative records on the utility bills of 
residential consumers, we have estimated the short-run consumption response to a price shock using 
an RD design whereby two-month consumption levels of households situated barely above an 
important tariff discontinuity are compared with those of consumers located barely below–hence 
focusing on a large group of relatively homogeneous consumers facing sizable differences in prices. 
We provide evidence that a price increase in the utility bill received by consumers causes a 
prompt and significant decline in gas consumption. We also show that customers appear to respond 
more to recent past bills than to expected prices moving forward. Our estimates therefore suggest that 
policy interventions via the price mechanism are powerful instruments to influence residential energy 
utilization patterns, but argue against an assumption of perfect awareness of complex price schedules 
by consumers. 
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CHAPTER 2. Tax Compliance and Enforcement in the Pampas. Evidence 
from a Field Experiment 
 
2.1. Introduction 
Tax evasion is a pervasive problem in many countries. In particular, some developing countries do not 
even collect half of what they are supposed to according to the written letter of the law.
14
 The 
academic literature has not been oblivious to the need for explaining why people pay (or don’t pay) 
taxes, and the striking differences in compliance across countries. Most of the literature has relied on 
the standard model of tax compliance developed by Allingham and Sandmo (1972), which suggests 
that each individual taxpayer faces a tradeoff between the monetary benefit of evading and pocketing 
the money, and the potential costs of being detected and having to pay the evaded tax plus a penalty. 
According to these models, how much each person evades is the result of the optimal decision of risk 
adverse individuals that maximize their expected utility. Tax evasion is supposed to decrease 
whenever the expected penalty (determined by the size of the penalty and the probability of getting 
caught) increases.  
Even though this model, along with Yitzhaki (1974), has been the workhorse behind most 
academic research and its results have guided public policies, some of its implications do not square 
well with real world evidence. In particular, with the fact that people tend to comply with the law 
more regularly than what the model would suggest given that in most countries fines and audit 
probabilities are rather low (Alm et al 1992, Andreoni et al 1998, Dhami and al-Nowaihi 2007, Frey 
and Torgler 2007).  To explain this puzzle, two main strands of literature have developed by 
grounding the research in behavioral economics. One strand modifies the axioms of expected utility 
theory by adding risk and uncertainty to the models (Yaniv 1999, Snow and Warren 2005, Dhami and 
al-Nowaihi 2007 and 2010). The other incorporates additional costs to the expected utility function by 
making the decision process of the individual taxpayer to be affected also by social interactions 
(Cowell and Gordon 1988, Gordon 1989, Myles and Naylor 1996, Kim 2003, Bayer 2006, Fortin et al 
2007, Eisenhauer 2008, Dell’Anno 2009, Traxler 2010). In these latter models, taxpayers do not only 
weigh the monetary payoffs but also the moral implications of their decisions. What other taxpayers 
are doing and how the government uses public revenues have a high burden on tax evasion decisions 
(Torgler 2002). 
Combining these two strands provides predictions more in line with the empirical evidence: 
most people declare more than what the standard model would suggest and not everybody engages in 
tax evasion (Hashimzade et al 2012). In terms of their policy implications, levels of compliance seem 
                                                          
14
 For example, that is the case for personal income taxation and corporate income taxation in Argentina, 
Dominican Republic, Ecuador and Guatemala, according to recent studies summarized in IDB (2013). 
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to depend not only on actual rates but also on people’s subjective beliefs about the levels of 
enforcement and penalties, the behavior of other taxpayers, the use of public monies by the 
government, and on some additional intrinsic motivations. As such, it may be possible to increase the 
levels of tax compliance by raising the salience of enforcement and penalties, the level of compliance 
of their neighbors, and the efficiency and/or effectiveness of government expenditures, where trust on 
government authorities may be a mediating factor.
15
  
While the theoretical literature has advanced steadily, the empirical literature has not reached 
the same level of consensus yet. For example, while most studies to date find a positive result for 
reducing tax evasion by increasing the rates or salience of penalties and audits (e.g., Blumenthal et al 
2001a), there is still controversy about the effect of messages that appeal to moral considerations, and 
those reflecting the use of public monies by the government. For example, while Alm et al (1992), 
Torgler (2003) and several survey-based studies find confirmatory evidence, Blumenthal et al 
(2001b), Torgler (2004), and Fellner et al (2011) do not find common effects across all type of 
taxpayers. 
One way to test the hypotheses and shed new light to this literature is by affecting taxpayers’ 
beliefs with information (IDB 2008; Coleman, 1996, 2007, Thaler and Sunstein, 2008) in a large-scale 
randomized field experiment. For that purpose, we conducted an experiment that affected the 
collection of the most relevant municipal tax in a municipality of Argentina. This tax, locally known 
as tasas, is levied upon individuals according to the size of the property and the services they receive 
from the local government such as street-lighting, and trash collection and street cleaning. 
Approximately 23,000 individual taxpayers of this tasa in the Municipality of Junín, a midsize and 
largely urbanized district located in the upper north of Argentina´s main province Buenos Aires, who 
are billed bimonthly, were randomly divided into 4 groups. One of the groups received no treatment 
(the control group); the other 3 were treated by including messages in their tax bill. The treatments 
were designed to test the main determinants of tax compliance according to the literature: deterrence 
(or beliefs about enforcement and fines), equity (or beliefs about other taxpayers’ behavior), and 
fairness (or the beliefs about the use of resources by the government) (Congdon, Kling, and 
Mullainathan, 2011, Hashimzade, Myles, and Tran-Nam, 2012).  
The results from the experiment indicate that introducing messages in the tax bill may be a 
good instrument for affecting taxpayers’ behavior. Still, not all the messages seem to have the same 
effect. The most effective message was the deterrence one, which stated the actual fines and potential 
administrative and judicial steps that the municipality might follow in the case of non-compliance. 
More precisely, tax compliance among the taxpayers that received this deterrence message increased 
                                                          
15
 Some studies looking at this issue include Aguirre and Rocha (2010), Alm and Martinez-Vazquez (2007), 
Torgler et al. (2008), Alm and Torgler (2004), Cummings et al. (2005), Dell’Anno (2009); Frey and Torgler 
(2005),  Scholz and Lubell (1998a), Scholz and Pinney (1995), and Murphy (2004). 
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by almost 5 percentage points with respect to the control group (which is equivalent to reducing tax 
evasion by more than 10%).
16
 We don’t find any average treatment effects for the other two messages. 
This result, which is in line with Torgler (2004) and Fellner et al (2011), contradicts the evidence in 
the survey-based literature.
17
 While people tend to answer that they would be willing to pay more 
taxes, this behavior is not corroborated in practice. Interestingly, we do find some heterogeneous 
effects across the population, which indicates that not everybody reacts to the messages, and among 
those who responses can go on either direction (higher or lower compliance). 
In addition to its policy relevance (a low-cost high-return policy innovation), this chapter 
contributes to the existing literature on the importance of information flows for influencing the 
individual taxpayer´s compliance decision (e.g., Blumenthal et al, 2001a, 2001b; Pomeranz, 2010; 
Kleven et al, 2011; and Fellner, Saugruber and Traxler, 2011) in several ways. First, having grounded 
the research design on both, the behavioral economics and tax evasion theoretical literature, this 
chapter gets closer to performing a more comprehensive test of the different hypotheses out there by 
evaluating the three main hypotheses (equity, fairness, and deterrence) at the same time. This way, it 
is possible to compare their relative significance better than if done across studies.  
Second, it provides further evidence regarding which (if any) of the mechanisms usually 
identified by the theoretical literature is relevant for explaining taxpayer behaviors. As such, this 
chapter is influential not only because of its findings but also because of what it does not find. As 
mentioned above, it reinforces the notion that enforcement matters while reducing the confidence in 
across-the-board mechanisms that stress equity and fairness considerations. If the evidence keeps 
mounting, these results should encourage researchers to evaluate how much to stress the use of tax 
morale mechanisms in the theoretical models as a way to square off the theory with the stylized facts 
with, and to weigh appropriately the findings of the survey-based literature. For example, some 
theoretical papers require a high value of the parameter of tax morale to revert the Allingham and 
Sandmo’s result on the effect of changes on tax rates on evasion. The existence of heterogeneous 
effects may also encourage researchers to develop more complex models of social interaction based 
on heterogeneous agents over a wider range of parameters. 
Third, the experiment was carried out on a property-based tax. Instead, the previous literature 
has focused on income taxes (e.g. Blumenthal et al, 2001a, 2001b; Kleven et al, 2011), VAT 
(Pomeranz, 2010), or very specific fees (Fellner, Saugruber and Traxler, 2011). Because the revenue 
of this tax is directly related to the provision of highly-visible locally-provided public services, it 
                                                          
16
 Our results may be underestimating the true effect. Even though every taxpayer received the message, it’s not 
certain that all of them have read it. 
17
 Finding different results between opinion-based surveys and behavior-based experiments is not unique to this 
case. Lacetera et al (2013) report similar results in the area of blood donations. There, while people report in 
surveys that they would be less likely to donate if offered a monetary reward, the field experiment evidence does 
not support those findings. 
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should work better for measuring the impact of messages that target the fairness of the tax system on 
actual payments (Torgler 2004).  
Fourth, by concentrating the research design on studying the decision of paying or not paying 
an amount that is “exogenously” determined, as we do here, helps to estimate more precisely the 
impact of the policy (because it reduces the possibility of changes in behavior in other markets –e.g. 
labor market-, and increases in tax elusion that may affect some of the estimations based on declared 
income) and provides a direct measure of reductions in tax evasion, which changes in reported income 
may not capture. Moreover, this chapter uses as outcome variable actual payment behavior instead of 
willingness to pay. While survey responses could be very valuable for understanding changes in 
perceptions (a relevant policy experiment by itself), it is only through measuring changes in actual 
payment behavior that researchers can feel confident that they are actually testing the hypotheses in 
the theoretical models. 
Fifth, while previous studies typically rely on mailing letters to potential evaders, we include 
the messages and images directly into the tax bill, ameliorating some (but not all) of the concerns 
regarding intent-to-treat (ITT) bias (there will still be some taxpayers, particularly among the group of 
tax evaders who don’t even read the bill).18 
Sixth, instead of sending the messages to a selected sample of known evaders, which may 
lead to problems of sample selection and external validity, we have randomized the treatment over the 
entire population of compliant and non-compliant taxpayers. This way, we included every type of 
taxpayer -which may have the added bonus in terms of policy implications of not only helping to 
generate positive incentives for those who had failed to pay in the past but also to maintain 
compliance of the formerly “good” taxpayers. This strategy shows also relevant as we uncover 
heterogeneous effects across this splitting. As such, it helps to guide better policies that may be 
otherwise aimed at the universe of taxpayers (with negative consequences). 
Finally, focusing on a developing country helps to validate the results in the literature in a 
region, Latin America, where tax evasion is rampant. Therefore, understanding the relative effects of 
different policies is more relevant. Moreover, this is a region where trust in government is lower than 
in the developed world, which again, could further our understanding of the effect of messages in 
such an environment. As a side product, we are also providing with an exact measure of tax evasion 
on property-like tax for an average size Municipality in the region. 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 2.2 reviews the literature on the 
determinants of tax compliance and discusses current approaches on how to increase compliance 
                                                          
18
 In a survey conducted by the authors on a sample of representative taxpayers from another Municipality, 82 
percent answered that they had read at least some parts of the bill. This percentage drops to 56% when asked 
about whether they read any other accompanying material sent by the Municipality. 
-30- 
 
 
 
based on the standard tax evasion model and recent developments on behavioral economics related to 
the effects of tax morale. Section 2.3 describes the field experiment and our main results as well as 
some additional empirical analyses. Section 2.4 presents our main findings. Section 2.5, concludes 
and discusses some potential avenues for future research. 
2.2.Why do people pay taxes? 
As it was already mentioned, the standard model of tax compliance (Allingham and Sandmo, 1972 
(AS); Yitzhaki, 1974 (Y)) suggests that taxpayers face a tradeoff between the monetary benefits of 
evading and pocketing the money, and the potential costs of being detected and having to pay the 
evaded tax plus a penalty. Tax evasion levels are the optimal decision of risk adverse individuals that 
maximize their expected utility. Given the assumptions of this model, tax evasion decreases whenever 
the expected penalty (determined by the amount of the penalty and the probability of getting caught) 
increases.
19
 
 One way the literature has found to explain why people comply more than what the actual 
rates of enforcement and penalties would suggest has been to add a term to the standard formulation 
that captures the additional individual (psychic, moral, social) costs that the taxpayer faces when 
evading (Gordon 1989, Myles and Naylor 1996, Kim 2003, Fortin et al. 2007, Traxler 2010). The 
parameters included in this additional term usually depend on the beliefs of the taxpayer regarding the 
fairness and equity of the system.
20
 Then, following Traxler (2010), the optimization problem can be 
formulated as follows  
 (  )   [ (  )]       ( ) 
where e, the share of tax being evaded, is the variable of choice of the individual, the first term is the 
traditional expected utility term coming from the AS (1972) and Y (1974) models, and the second is a 
term that captures the moral cost of tax evasion. In this formulation, the “moral” cost depends on how 
much each individual internalizes the social cost [i], which may depend on how much each 
individual evaluates the degree of fairness of the tax system, and a function c(n) that captures the 
strength of the norm for a given share of evaders n (or the equity of the system).
21
 
 The policy implications of this setting are obvious. Tax evasion drops as penalties and 
enforcement increases (as in the traditional model), and it also decreases as i (fairness) increases and 
n decreases (or equity increases) –for formal proof see Traxler (2010, pages 92-93). Overall, the 
empirical evidence (in particular survey and cross-section studies) tends to support these results. 
                                                          
19
 For space limitations, and because these are very well known models in the economics profession, we don’t 
reiterate their formulation here. For comprehensive overviews see Traxler (2010) and Hashimzade et al (2012) 
among others. 
20
 Dell’Anno (2009) presents a very detailed and schematic table summarizing the literature on tax morale and 
compliance. 
21
 As mentioned, this is one of the many ways to model the moral costs. See Hashimzade et al (2012) for a 
survey of different alternative models. 
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People tend to comply more if they believe that others comply too, and if they believe that the 
government makes a good use of the money it collects. According to survey evidence, there is a 
significant correlation between tax morale and the size of the shadow economy (Alm and Torgler, 
2004) and individuals who have heard about tax avoidance have a significantly lower tax morale than 
others (Torgler, 2005). It has also been found that a higher sense of obedience leads to higher 
compliance, so that if an individual believes that others comply with the tax code then their tax 
evasion will diminish (Scholz and Pinney, 1995, Scholz and Lubell, 1998; Torgler et al 2008).
22
 It has 
also been observed from laboratory experiments and surveys that there is a positive correlation 
between taxpayers’ priors about the tax code fairness and tax compliance (Rawling, 2004, Cumming 
et al, 2006). In connection to the behavior of public officials, there is a positive correlation between 
tax morale and the belief that the government will spend the money wisely. For example, Barone and 
Mocetti (2009) find that that the attitude towards paying taxes is more positive when resources are 
spent more efficiently.
23
  
Factors affecting tax morale can explain differences in tax compliance across countries or 
regions with similar tax systems. For example, Bergman and Narvaez (2006) rely on differences in tax 
morale to explain the success of Chile and the failure of Argentina in collecting taxes over the 
nineties. Recent empirical evidence also shows that there is significantly lower tax morale in South 
America and Mexico than in Central America and the Caribbean (Torgler, 2005). 
Evidence compiled at the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) using data from the 
Americas Barometer for a selected group of countries for which data is available show similar results 
(Scartascini, 2011).
24
 Basically, people who are more satisfied with the provision of public services at 
the local level, who trust the municipality more, who have not been exposed to corruption, and who 
consider the level of interpersonal trust to be higher tend to answer that they would be more willing to 
pay higher taxes to the municipality. Similar evidence has been found by Ortega, Ronconi and 
Sanguinetti (2012) based on household survey data for 17 Latin American cities. In their study, the 
net share of people responding that they would be willing to pay more taxes if the government 
improved their performance is positive and significant in most cities and for most measures of better 
performance. Moreover, they find that reading a brief piece of factual information was able to 
generate significant changes in perceptions in some but not all of the cities in the study. In one of 
them they find evidence of reciprocity and of a fairly sizable magnitude. 
                                                          
22
 Relatedly, Traxler and Winter (2012) find that the more commonly a norm violation is believed to occur, the 
lower is the individual’s inclination to punish it. 
23
 It is important to notice that this does not capture trust in government in general, but the individual’s opinion 
about government’s spending behavior (Aguirre and Rocha, 2010; Alm and Martinez-Vazquez, 2007; Murphy, 
2004). 
24
 Survey waves 2008 and 2010 for Colombia, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Honduras, Peru, and Uruguay.  
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2.2.1. Existing experimental evidence 
As Ortega et al (2012) show, in order to change people´s perceptions it may not be necessary to 
change actual policies. The way in which people form their beliefs depends on the information they 
receive and the way it is presented, and their underlying system of beliefs (IDB 2008, Thaler and 
Sunstein 2008). Coleman (1996, 2007) conducted a randomized controlled trial in Minnesota using 
messages to affect tax compliance. The State Revenue Service sent a letter to 20,000 taxpayers with a 
message designed to correct the erroneous perception of many taxpayers that cheating on taxes was 
common. The impact of the message was significant: the mean increase in federal declared taxable 
income for the group receiving the letter was $2,390. Wenzel (2001, 2005) found similar results in 
Australia.  
Blumenthal et al (2001a) studied the impact of messages sent to 1724 randomly selected 
taxpayers in Minnesota as well. The message consisted of informing that the returns they were about 
to file would be closely examined. The result was that those in the treatment group (individuals who 
received the letter) increased their average tax payments compared to previous years. In particular, the 
effect was stronger for the self-employed, who may have a higher opportunity to evade. Blumenthal et 
al (2001b) does not find significant average effects when the messages present normative appeals 
instead.  
Torgler (2003) conducted a lab experiment in a small village of Costa Rica where only 37 
volunteers –actual taxpayers- participated. The experiment consisted on three types of interventions in 
order to study tax compliance. The first was related to public goods provision financed from the taxes 
paid, the second was a moral suasion, and the third was a positive reward for tax compliance. Results 
show that the three interventions had a positive effect on tax compliance. The moral suasion message, 
even though large and positive for explaining timelines of payments, was not statistically significant 
when utilized in a randomized controlled trial with 580 taxpayers in a small town in Switzerland 
(Torgler 2004).  
In the same vein, Kleven et al (2011) conducted a randomized field experiment over a 
representative sample of 40,000 taxpayers in Denmark. In the first stage, half of the population was 
randomly selected to be audited, while the rest was deliberately not audited. In the second stage, they 
sent threat-of-audit letters to a random sample in the two groups. Both the audits and the letters had a 
significant positive effect on self-reported income. Similar results were found by Pomeranz (2010), 
who finds that random audit announcements are transmitted up the VAT chain and increase 
compliance by firms’ suppliers. 
Finally, Fellner, Sausgruber and Traxler (2011) carried out a large field experiment with 
potential evaders of TV license fees in Austria sending different messages to taxpayers. They find a 
strong effect on compliance, particularly for a treatment aimed at raising the salience of detection 
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risks. Neither appealing to morals nor providing information about other taxpayers’ compliance 
behavior had any significant effect on compliance. A potential limitation of this study is that it does 
not provide a precise measure of evasion, as TV license avoidance is hard to detect.   
Still, in spite of the growing number of articles on the topic, this is still a nascent literature 
and more work is warranted. First, while some results seem to have become robust findings, such as 
the positive effect of the threat to audit on compliance, there is still no definitive answer about some 
of the other potential determinants.  For example, while some papers find positive effects for moral 
suasion treatments (Torgler, 2003) others do not (Fellner et al, 2011). Similarly occurs with the 
fairness treatments. Torgler (2003) finds positive effects; Ortega et al (2012) does too, but only under 
some restrictive conditions (which makes the results significant for the group in only 1 out of 17 cities 
in which they performed the survey experiment). 
Second, most of the studies have been written for developed countries, where tax evasion is 
low, enforcement is a regular activity of the tax administration, and trust in government is high. 
Pursuing these studies in developing countries would allow to test the value of the hypotheses in 
contexts in where tax evasion is rampant, governments have fewer resources for enforcing laws, and 
trusts in the institutions is lower. Third, while most studies have focused on income taxes (e.g. 
Blumenthal et al, 2001a, 2001b; Kleven et al, 2011), VAT (Pomeranz, 2010), or very specific fees 
(Fellner, Saugruber and Traxler, 2011), few have dealt with taxes that are directly linked to the 
provision of a public good. Hence, the possibility of testing for the relevance of public goods 
provision on compliance has been indirect at best. 
Fourth, given that the judge is still out there regarding which –if any- of the policy options 
matter for affecting compliance, it would be important to evaluate them within the same experimental 
framework in order to ensure that differences in their effectiveness come from the policy itself and not 
the context in which they are applied. Finally, in order to increase the external (and internal) validity, 
studies would benefit from working on the overall population affected by a specific tax rather than on 
a selected sample of taxpayers. The experimental design of the experiment described in this chapter 
has attempted to deal with these issues.  
2.3.The experiment 
With the objective of raising compliance with the tax and evaluating the effectiveness of sending 
different messages to the taxpayers, the Municipality of Junín agreed to include three different 
messages in the tax bill through a randomized experimental design. These messages were expected to 
change taxpayers’ beliefs regarding the equity, fairness, and enforcement of the tax. In terms of 
academic relevance, the experiment would provide further evidence regarding hypotheses that have 
shown elusive to corroborate, it may provide the basis for further theoretical elaboration, and test the 
external validity of previous research. 
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2.3.1. Background on the CVP in Junín 
The “Public Space Conservation” tax (Tasa de Conservación de la Via Pública, or CVP henceforth) is 
a tax that is levied upon real estate. Taxed property includes homes, farms, business premises, and 
most other real estate. The tax is computed by taking into account the linear frontage, in meters, of the 
taxed real estate, the number of streetlights around the property, and the type of trash collection and 
street cleaning services it receives.
25
 Property owners are billed every two months. Taxpayers have 
approximately 10 days to pay from the moment they receive the bill to the first due date. In case of 
payment delays, a cumulative compound monthly interest rate of 2% is applied to the outstanding 
liabilities.  
By August 2011, there were around 26,000 individual taxpayers registered to pay the CVP, 
equivalent to a third of the population of Junín, according to the last 2010 Argentine census.
26 
While 
the tax is levied every two months, the Municipality also allows taxpayers to pay it on a yearly or 
monthly basis. However, only around 12% of the taxpayers select either of these modalities. The large 
majority of the taxpayers (around 80%) pay their monies personally at the Municipality or other 
premises of the local government instead of using direct deposit or other automatic payment 
modalities.
27
 Most taxpayers own one relatively small taxed property and only 20% of the taxpayers 
own more than one registered taxed property. Also, there are 2.7% of the registered taxpayers with 
postal address outside the municipality of Junín.
28
 
Over the last four years, tax compliance, defined as total tax payments over tax liabilities, 
hovered around 40% percent on average in each bi-monthly billing cycle. Compliance exhibited a 
declining trend from 2010 onwards, only to show a gradual recovery in 2011. Moreover, payments 
display a marked seasonal behavior with larger payments made in January and February (bimester 1), 
mainly as a result of taxpayers paying in advance some their ensuing liabilities for the remaining of 
the year (see Figure 7). 
Junín is divided in 15 districts and 10 sections (see maps in Appendix 3). Districts are larger 
and generally encompass more than 1 section. Tax compliance, public services’ provision as well as 
the number and size of taxed real estate vary widely across districts as a reflection of heterogeneous 
characteristics of the underlying taxpayer population. As the capital city of the municipality, Junín is 
the largest district in terms of the number of taxpayers and taxed properties as well as the amount of 
taxes collected. Within the city of Junín itself, there is also a large heterogeneity in taxpayers´ 
observable characteristics across sections. While the remaining districts are largely rural, they also 
                                                          
25
 While there is available information on the fiscal valuation of the majority of the taxed real state for 2009, the 
data is not utilized for the computation of CVP´s liabilities as it is deemed unreliable and outdated by the local 
authorities. Hence, we don’t use it in our baseline estimations.  
26
 http://www.censo2010.indec.gov.ar/definitivos_bajarArchivo.asp?idc=93&arch=x  
27
 Unfortunately, the municipality does not collect this data at the individual level. 
28
 It includes, mostly, people with investment properties or second homes in the city. 
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include some small cities. As it can be observed in Table 12, Junín is quite similar (although slightly 
richer) to the average municipality in the Province of Buenos Aires (the most populated province in 
Argentina).  
The units of analysis are individual taxpayers. We excluded private companies and social 
organizations from the sample because for those taxpayers somebody different than the person 
receiving the treatment may make the payment decision, which could bias the results.
29
 Among the 
individual taxpayers of the CVP in Junín, the entire universe was included in the randomized field 
experiment with the exception of 3,000 individuals that had previously paid in advance their tax 
liabilities, and therefore were not billed in the period the experiment took place. For each taxpayer, we 
have collected the administrative information on tax liabilities, tax arrears, the number and size of 
taxed real estate (e.g. average linear front meters) and some public goods provided by the 
Municipality (e.g. streetlights, garbage collection, and street cleaning services). The definition of each 
one of these variables is provided in Table 13. 
For selecting the taxpayers into each treatment, we followed a stratified or block 
randomization strategy due to the presence of highly correlated taxpayers´ observable characteristics 
at the section level.
30
 Therefore, we use the geographical location of each taxpayer to define the strata 
or blocks. In the case of taxpayers listed with a mailing address from outside the Municipality, we 
created an additional artificial block as they may show highly idiosyncratic unobservable 
characteristics. Further, taxpayers registering multiple properties but lacking a unique mailing address 
were assigned to the section in which the property with the highest tax liability prior to the experiment 
was located. We also found that 4% of the taxpayers had multiple fiscal identifications (ID) numbers 
but the same exact name, surname and mailing address. Because despite consulting with the 
Municipality it was not possible to establish the cause of this situation, we decided to treat these 
“duplicated” taxpayers as single taxable units, to reduce potential assignment errors. Hence, a 
fictitious unique identification number was created and utilized in the randomization procedures for 
those taxpayers 
Within each block, for each taxpayer randomly assigned to a treatment a taxpayer was 
assigned to the control group. Thus, because we have three treatments, sixty percent of the taxpayers 
were randomly assigned to the control group (about 15,000), and the remainder was equally 
distributed to each of the treatment groups within each strata (about 2,500 each). Even though this 
decision may have lowered power for each treatment, and it may work against finding statistically 
significant results, it would also reduce the possibility of cross-treatment contamination (which could 
                                                          
29
 For example, the bill may be received by a clerk who had been instructed in advance by the firm´s owner 
about whether to pay the bill or not. The decision then would have been unaffected by the treatment. 
30
 For instance, the calculation of a simple measure of intra-section correlation yields a coefficient of 0.5 for 
trash collection and other locally provided public services, 0.25 for the number of streetlights and 0.2 for the 
average tax liabilities and the number of unrecoverable debtors. 
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have affected the ability of finding different results across treatments). Contamination of the control 
group instead would render the estimates as a lower bound. This decision of “undertreating” was also 
in line with the municipal government’s preferences. 
In order to ensure the right balance across groups, we ran the randomization 1000 times and 
selected the random draw that showed the best balance for all the pre-experimental covariates 
(including the pre-experimental outcome variable) controlling for the strata dummies. The final draw 
was selected according to two criteria: (a) the minimum statistical difference between treatment and 
control for draws statistically significant at a five percent or lower; and, (b) the minimum maximum t-
stat (Bruhn and McKenzie, 2008). 
After the randomization and random assignment of taxpayers, we also carried out a 
comprehensive set of actions aimed at minimizing potential administrative errors during 
implementation that could affect the randomized design of the experiment. First, we sent to the local 
authorities, three weeks before they started to print the tax bills, a file with a code assigning each 
taxpayer to either the treatment groups or the control. Based on that codification, the Municipality 
generated an administrative record that we compared against our files in order to detect and correct 
any mistakes with the randomization. Second, we also conducted, one week prior to distribution of the 
tax bills, a physical check with a random sample of 1,000 printed bills at the Municipality in Junín. 
No assignment errors were found in this final control.  
The tax bills containing the treatment messages were sent in August 2011, corresponding to 
payments due in the September-October (Bim 5) billing period of the same year. That period might be 
considered “normal” as there are no pronounced seasonal variations in tax payments like in the 
January-February (Bim 1) billing period in which a large number of tax payments is made in advance 
for the rest of the year. 
2.3.2. The treatments 
We describe below the treatment messages that were included in the tax bill. The wording of the 
messages and the selection of the images was prepared by a communications team in coordination 
with the municipal authorities and tested in a small focus group. In every case, and following standard 
recommendations in the literature, the objective was to provide the combination of words and pictures 
that could have the maximum impact while conveying the message that was intended. 
Deterrence 
The first treatment included a message in the tax bill that provided taxpayers with a simplified 
example of the cost of non-compliance by computing how much the cost of a hypothetical debt of 
AR$ 1,000 would be after a year (given a cumulative monthly interest rate of 2%). Specifically, the 
message stated that, for a liability of such amount, the taxpayer would have to pay AR$ 269 in arrears 
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after that period of time. The message also warned the taxpayers that the Municipality would take 
administrative and legal steps in case of non-compliance. An image of a judicial hammer was also 
included in the tax bill with the intention of reinforcing the deterrence message. Table 14 provides the 
translated text of the messages and an example of a tax bill is included (in Spanish) in the Appendix 4.  
The aim of the message was two-fold: (a) raising the taxpayers’ subjective perception of the 
probability of receiving a fine and other possible administrative or legal penalties in the case of non-
compliance, and; (b) reducing the likely computational costs derived from the calculation of arrears 
on unpaid tax liabilities using a compounded interest rate. The literature on tax compliance that 
incorporates the insights of behavioral economics points to the importance of limited computational 
capabilities, particularly in the case of relatively complex intertemporal tax calculations for explaining 
taxpayers´ responses to fines and other penalties (Congdon et al, 2011). This literature also suggests 
that, in the presence of taxpayers with limited attention, raising the salience of fines and legal actions 
in the case of non-compliance might have an effect on individual behavior with respect to tax 
payments (Bernheim and Rangel, 2007 and 2009).  
Fairness 
The second treatment introduced a message in the bill with information about the actual use of 
revenues by the Municipality. It highlights the number of streetlights, and water sewerage connections 
installed by the local government of Junín in the previous six months. The message was also 
accompanied by an image of an easily recognizable “men at work” traffic signal (Table 14 and sample 
tax bill in the Annex 3). This message was intended to modify taxpayer´s perceptions about the 
fairness of the tax by influencing their priors about the supply and quality of public services provided 
by the Municipality (Cowell and Gordon, 1996).  
Equity 
The third treatment introduced a message in the tax bill about the levels of CVP compliance. The 
message asked whether the taxpayer was aware that only three out of ten taxpayers did not pay their 
tax liabilities.
31 
It also added a sentence questioning whether the taxpayer was currently paying her 
liabilities (“What about you?”), which attempted to capture the essence of the moral suasion 
arguments. In order to reinforce the message, the bill also contained an image with seven larger 
figures, personifying the tax payers who pay and do it on time, and three smaller ones, representing 
the people who don’t do it on time (Table 14 and sample tax bill in the Appendix 4). The goal of the 
message was to influence taxpayers´ perceptions about the extent of evasion in the local community 
as suggested by Dell´Anno (2009).  
                                                          
31
 The message corresponds with the fact that 30 percent of the taxpayers are considered “unrecoverable 
debtors” (have basically never paid their tax bill). The other 70 percent have paid with some recurrence even if 
they had not done it in the last bimester before the experiment. 
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 We are aware that even though extreme care has been taken in selecting the factual 
information and wording so the messages would tend to encourage people to update their beliefs 
upward (and reduce evasion), it is still possible that some people may have updated them in the 
opposite direction. For this reason, in the empirical work, we have taken special care in looking into 
potential heterogeneous effects. Of course, it may still be the case that those who usually do not pay 
are also skeptical of government messages, and may not update their beliefs at all regardless of the 
message they receive. 
2.3.3. The dependent variables 
We have defined the outcome variable in several alternative ways (but always dichotomously) in 
order to ensure we capture changes in behavior as precisely as possible. The main outcome variable, 
paid, takes the value 1 only if the taxpayer has paid in full the total tax liabilities for the period of the 
experiment. Two variables record the timeliness of the payment: paid_by1D takes the value of 1 if the 
payment took place before the 1
st
 due date; paid_by2D takes the value of 1 if the payment took place 
before the 2
nd
 due date. Because the taxpayer may decide to pay in addition some arrears and reduce 
its debt or to pay in advance future liabilities we created the variable overpaid, which takes the value 
1 if the taxpayer has paid not only her liabilities for the period in full but she has also made some 
additional payments. For taxpayers with multiple properties, all these variables take value 1 if the 
taxpayer paid all of the bills in full.
32
 Finally, the variable addpayments takes a value 1 when the 
taxpayer has made advanced payments or paid down part of her debt, regardless of whether they have 
paid their current liabilities in full.  
Table 15 presents the summary statistics for the three treatment groups, compared to the 
control group in the pre-experimental Bim3 billing period. As expected, given the random 
assignment, average observable characteristics for each one of the groups is very similar.
33
 Most 
importantly, there are no statistically significant differences among the groups in terms of the 
dependent variables. Table 15 indicates that previous to the experiment, around 21 percent of 
taxpayers paid before the 1
st
 due date. This figure increased to 33 percent before the 2
nd
 due date. By 
the end of the bimester, 40 percent of taxpayers had paid the liabilities for the period in full. 
Additionally, 3 percent of those taxpayers had made additional payments during the period, such as 
paying down their debt. In total, approximately 4.5 percent had made some kind of additional 
payments. 
How do these percentages translate into money? Basically, while the average liability for the 
CVP amounts to AR$ 122, the mean tax payment is equivalent to AR$ 56. On average, the typical 
                                                          
32
 We have also used different cutoffs such as 60% of the taxed properties without finding any significant 
changes in the results. 
33
 Only the variable monthly payments, for one of the treatment groups, is statistically significant at the 5% 
level. 
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individual taxpayer owns more than one property of 16 linear front meters, her trash is collected 
regularly, and has almost 3 street lights surrounding her property. Finally, we also include in the Table 
15 the balance of randomization for the public services variables in the period in which we conducted 
the experiment to show that no public works affected the groups differentially. 
2.3.4. Empirical strategy 
To estimate the causal effects of the treatment messages on tax compliance, we employ a probit 
model. Formally, we estimate the following specification:  
    (      )   (                              )    (1) 
Where Y is the binary outcome variable equal to one if the individual taxpayer i meets her tax 
obligations in the bi-monthly billing period 5 (September-October) according to any of the definitions 
provided before; T are binary variables representing the three treatment messages (T1=Deterrence; 
T2=Fairness; and T3=Equity), Z is a vector of control variables comprising taxpayer´s observable 
characteristics (e.g. income proxies, payment frequency and compliance status) and the amount and 
type of public services provided by the municipality (e.g. number of streetlights and trash collection 
and street cleaning services), and  is a set of strata fixed effects. Following Duflo et al (2008) and 
Angrist and Pischke (2008), we include the lagged outcome variable as an additional control to avoid 
potential serial correlation concerns, mainly because there is high persistence on payment behavior.  
2.4.Results 
Table 16 presents the average treatment effects (ATE) of the probit estimation described in equation 
(1) –table shows marginal the effects computed at the mean.34 Baseline estimations include the three 
treatment messages, the lagged outcome variable (because compliance shows great persistence), and 
strata fixed effects. The estimations with controls also include the variables for public service 
provision (trash collection and street lightning services during the period), the number of properties 
that each taxpayer has, the average linear front size of the properties, and a dummy that controls for 
those taxpayers who selected to pay monthly.
35
  
The result that comes clearly out of the estimations is that the deterrence message had a 
positive, and statistically and economically significant effect on compliance while the other two 
messages had no significant average effect. The size of the effect differs according to the dependent 
variable used. As expected, the size of the effect is larger for our main variable of interest, paid, that 
considers compliance with the tax regardless of the date in which payments took place. In this case, 
                                                          
34
 Full regression tables are provided in the Appendix 4. 
35
 Public services are included contemporaneously instead of lagged to control for any effect on payments that 
could have been caused by an increase or decrease of public services during the period of the experiment. 
Results are identical if we include these variables lagged instead. Also, results are basically identical if we run 
the regressions without including fixed effects as shown in the Tables in the Appendix 4.  
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the message increased compliance by almost 5 percentage points, which represents an increase in 
compliance rates of approximately 12 percent. 
Results are smaller in magnitude for the other dependent variables but no less interesting in 
terms of the policy implications. The message increased compliance before the first due date by 
almost 2 percentage points, and compliance before the second due date by 3 percentage points. 
Moreover, it does not only had an effect on the compliance for current liabilities: taxpayers who 
received this message were also more likely to pay arrears and future liabilities in advance. These 
results confirm the hypotheses coming from the theoretical literature: increasing the salience of 
penalties affects compliance behavior. 
Results remain statistically identical when we include the additional controls, which include 
proxies for taxpayers’ observable characteristics such as the number of associated taxed properties 
and monthly payment frequency, as well as indicators of public services provided by the Municipality 
(the number of streetlights and trash collection/street cleaning services). These variables display the 
expected signs (as shown in Tables 3 to 6 in the Appendix 2). In addition to the persistence in 
payment behavior, those who paid in the past are more likely to keep paying in the present, people 
who receive more public services from the municipality do too. As suggested by recent theoretical 
work, the perception of an adequate provision of public goods with respect to tax payments or 
“fairness” might provide an incentive to comply with the tax code (Hashimzade et al, 2013). Still, this 
is evidence of a correlation and not necessarily of causation.  
Taxpayers who pay monthly are also more likely to comply more. This may be explained by 
selection bias because people have opted for this type of billing. Hence, they may be more aware of 
their responsibilities with the municipality. On the other hand, taxpayers with multiple properties 
and/or larger properties tend to display lower compliance. One explanation may be that wealthier 
individuals are more likely to engage in riskier activities (Sandmo, 2005). Of course, it may also be 
that people with multiple properties may be more likely to misplace some of the bills, or have rented 
properties (and rely on the tenants for the payment). 
So far, we have described the results for the marginal effects at the mean level. We have also 
checked for whether the size of the effect differs at different points in the distribution of the 
covariates. While the marginal effects tend to change, these differences tend be very small. As an 
example, and always using paid as the dependent variable, the effect of the deterrence message tends 
to decrease as the number of properties increase (from 0.049 for people with only one property –
which includes the majority of the population- to 0.034 in the upper tail of the distribution) and as the 
size of the property increases (from 0.05 to 0.041). It increases, however, as the provision of trash 
collection improves (from 0.042 for those with no collection to 0.049 for those with the best service). 
Figure 1 in Appendix 2 illustrates these. 
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While the results for the deterrence message are large, we find no average behavioral changes 
for people who have received either of the other two messages. There are several potential 
explanations for this non-result. First, invoking moral reasons, despite evidence in the literature that it 
may switch perceptions at the margin (as Ortega et al, 2012 have found), it may not affect payment 
behavior because the perceptions elasticity for changing tax compliance is low (Blumenthal et al 
2001b). This is not uncommon. For example, Fryer (2013) finds the same in an experiment in the 
education sector.
36
  
Second, people who do not comply may have lower trust in the government, which may 
translate into lower effectiveness of the messages (those who don’t trust the government may don’t 
trust the messages they receive about the levels of tax evasion and public works). Finally, the average 
effects may be masking differences across individuals. For example, while we expected that people 
would tend to evaluate the information about actual use of the money by the local government in 
positive terms, people who had priors about government works that were “too high” may have revised 
them downwards instead of upwards. We also expect that people would react similarly regarding the 
rate of compliance of their neighbors. 
We have checked for heterogeneous effects across the observable characteristics but we 
haven’t been able to find any significant results for most of the variables of interest.37 For example, 
we find no differential effect for the treatments neither across different levels of provision of public 
services by the municipality at the individual level nor by including a variable that measures the 
difference between the public goods they receive compared to the median public services provided in 
their strata. Therefore, we can’t show evidence that people develop different priors according to the 
services they receive and have adjusted their behavior differently after receiving the message. This 
(non) result weakens some of the claims in the studies that emphasize public service provision at the 
individual level as a source of people’s beliefs about public sector efficiency (and the fairness of the 
tax system). We do find some differences worth mentioning however.  
First, we find that past payment behavior seems to affect the relevance and effect of the 
deterrence and equity messages. As it can be observed in Figure 1a in the Appendix 2, which 
summarizes the marginal effects for the interaction between the deterrence message and the lagged 
outcome variable, the message has a positive impact on those taxpayers who had not paid in the 
previous period but it has no statistically significant effect for those who had. The opposite occurs 
regarding the equity message as shown in Figure 1b in the Appendix 2. While the effect of the 
message is zero for those who had no complied before, it is negative for those who had. That is, the 
                                                          
36
 A moral suasion message changed reported student’s beliefs about the relationship between education and 
outcomes. They also reported being more focused and working harder. However, there were no measurable 
changes in attendance, behavioral incidents, or test scores. 
37
 Regression results for the models with interactions are presented in Table 7 in the Appendix 2. The figures 
summarize the marginal effects of the interactions. 
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message seems to have had a disincentive effect on those who had complied in the past and had been 
overstating other people’s rates of compliance. There is of course, an alternative explanation. The fact 
that the government was advertising the degree of evasion may lead some people to believe that 
enforcement is lax and nothing would happen if they evade too. 
The same results can be observed if we use, instead of the lagged outcome variable, a variable 
that classifies taxpayers according to whether they have debts with the municipality or not. Again, 
only those with debts seem to be affected by the deterrence message (Figure 9a) and those with no 
debt tend to present a disincentive effect when handed the equity message (Figure 9b). Interestingly, 
not everyone with arrears behaves in the same way when presented with the equity message. When 
we incorporate a variable that takes into account the stock of debt of each taxpayer, we find that while 
people with zero or very small levels of accumulated debt tend to present the mentioned disincentive 
effect, the message has a positive effect on those with higher levels of debt (Figure 10). This result 
may imply that those who have rarely complied may have adapted their beliefs upward regarding 
compliance levels when confronted with the message.   
Results seem to differ too according to property sizes (Figure 11). The deterrence message 
seems to have a positive effect particularly on people with smaller property sizes (Figure 11a). 
Potential explanations include the existence of differences in risk aversion across income levels, 
higher sophistication in interpreting current penalty levels and enforcement abilities of the 
municipality, or the fact that penalties and interests have a lower relative burden as income increases. 
Additionally, while past payment behavior had no effect on the fairness message, there seems to be a 
differential effect however, when the treatment is interacted with the average size of the properties. 
The message seems to have a positive effect for people with smaller properties but a negative effect 
for people with larger ones (Figure 11b). One potential interpretation would be that expectations about 
the use of public monies by the municipality differ according to property size, and those with larger 
properties have a higher expectation about what the government should do. Hence, presented with 
actual information, they adapted their priors and their behavior. This result does not change when 
controlling for having one or more properties.  
 A final check on heterogeneous effects and formation of beliefs has been to run the 
regressions separately for the group of taxpayers who live outside the city given that they may hold 
different priors than the rest of the population. Interestingly, as a first approximation to the potential 
set of priors of this group of taxpayers, compliance is 25 percent lower than the average compliance in 
the city. The results, presented in Table 17, show that both, the deterrence and the fairness message 
tend to be positive (and larger than the results for the overall population). This would tend to indicate 
that people outside the city might have reacted more to the information about public services than 
people in the city, who are direct witnesses of the effort by the Municipality. 
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A potential concern with the results is that some of the taxpayers may have not read the 
messages, and therefore were not treated, introducing a downward bias in our estimates. In particular, 
there is a group, the “unrecoverable debtors”, defined as taxpayers that did not registered any 
payments on their CVP liabilities between 2007 and 2011, who are more likely to ignore the messages 
included in the bill.
38
 To investigate this potential concern, we estimate in Table 18 the same 
empirical model as before but excluding the taxpayers that were unrecoverable debtors by the Bim 3, 
2011 from the sample. The estimations show a slightly larger effect of the deterrence message 
treatment on tax compliance for some of the dependent variables, suggesting that we could be in fact 
underestimating its impact due to the presence of a potential intended-to-treat (ITT) downward bias 
(Dufflo et al 2008; Angrist and Prischke, 2008). Table 19 shows that this change in the magnitude of 
the deterrence message coefficient is not driven by a potential bias in the underlining distribution of 
taxpayers amongst treatments and control groups. The balancing between the treatment messages and 
the control group remains virtually unchanged when unrecoverable debtors are excluded from the 
sample.  
To provide some intuition for the findings in terms of revenues collected instead of individual 
level decisions, Figure 12 plots the tax compliance ratio –computed as tax payments over tax 
liabilities-, for the three treatment groups and the control group in Bim 5. It also displays the tax 
compliance ratio for the period when randomization was conducted (Bim 3 2011) as a benchmark as 
well as for the same billing period but one year before (Bim 5, 2010). This figure suggests that tax 
compliance for taxpayers that received the deterrence message was 3 percentage points higher than for 
taxpayers in the control group (no message). This difference is statistically significant according to a 
nonparametric test of proportions. Notice that tax compliance increases for both the treatment and the 
control groups with respect to the previous billing period and the same period a year before. A 
potential explanation is that the introduction of a simplified tax bill with an improved design by the 
Municipal authorities in the same bimonthly billing period than the experiment was conducted 
provided an incentive for this generalized increase in tax compliance across the treatment groups and 
the control.
39
 It is noteworthy that this effect does not affect the validity of our results as the same re-
designed bill was distributed to every taxpayer. 
                                                          
38
 We have tried with other proxies too, such as identifying potential “untreated” subjects according to different 
number of unpaid bills. The results show a non-linear relationship. As the definition of “unrecoverable debtor” 
is broaden then fewer non-compliant taxpayers who may be affected by the treatment are included in the 
sample, which reduces the size of the coefficients. 
39
 It may also be the case (even though we have no evidence) that some of the people in the control group may 
have learnt about the existence of the deterrence (or the other) messages from some of their neighbors; which 
may have ended up affecting our estimates downward. Therefore, we can’t rule out that the increase in 
compliance in the control group was affected by enforcement spillovers. Rincke and Traxler (2011) find 
sizeable spillover effects of actual enforcement –one additional household compliance for every three additional 
units of enforcement.  
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Summarizing, the evidence indicates that increasing the salience of enforcement has a 
positive effect on compliance. Messages that appeal to equity and fairness considerations do not 
necessarily show the same average effects. Still, information about public goods provision and the 
compliance behavior of other taxpayers seems to matter in some margins. While it is not necessarily 
clear that it would encourage compliance, under certain conditions it may discourage it.  
Unfortunately, we could not evaluate the persistence of the effects over time because the 
Municipality launched a moratorium during the following bimester. These types of payment plans 
facilitate the payment of arrears, and reduce outstanding liabilities (in particular they pardon some of 
the interests and penalties). Additionally, as mentioned previously, many people who received the 
messages decided to pay some of their future liabilities in advance, which could skew the results for 
the following bimester.
40
 
2.5.Conclusions and further research directions 
This chapter explores empirically whether providing information to taxpayers influences or not the 
individual taxpayer´s compliance decision. Specifically, we conducted a large randomized field 
experiment to test whether including messages in the tax bill about the levels of fairness, equity and 
enforcement of the tax would modify taxpayers´ behavior by affecting their beliefs about the use of 
public monies by the municipality, the prevailing level of compliance, and the severity of 
enforcement. This way, we attempted to provide evidence about the relative importance of these 
complementary policy instruments. 
For conducting the experiment, we randomized (within 25 geographical blocks) the entire 
universe of individual taxpayers of a property-based tax of a municipality in Argentina into 4 groups. 
Extending the experiment to the universe reduces problems of sample selection and increases the 
external validity of the experiment. Having conducted it in an average city of a developing country 
complements existing studies by testing the hypotheses in a context in which tax enforcement and 
trust in governments is lower, and tax evasion is rampant. Using a local property-based tax allows to 
test hypotheses about fairness more directly than using direct taxes collected by the federal 
government. 
Results indicate that the marginal probability or impact effect on tax payments for the group 
of taxpayers that received a deterrence message was on average around 4 percentage points higher 
than for the control group of taxpayers that did not received any message. To put these findings in 
context, extending the use of this message to the entire population of taxpayers may have resulted in a 
sizeable increase in revenues equivalent to more than 10%. Moreover, the empirical results may be 
understating the actual impact of such a policy, as some people who have not being paying the tax 
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 More than 700 people made advance payments in the period. This is more than 30 percent higher than in the 
pre-experimental bimester. 
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may have not read the message. Additionally, once people have accumulated debt, the incentive to 
comply in the current period does also fall.  
We find no average treatment results for the messages that were designed to affect the beliefs 
about the equity and fairness of the taxes. The reasons behind this are multiple. First, even if messages 
affect perceptions these may not translate into changes in behavior. Second, lower trust in government 
may translate into lower effectiveness of the messages (those who don’t pay taxes because they don’t 
trust the government may also do not trust the messages about levels of tax evasion and public 
works). Third, the average effects may be masking differences across individuals. Some of these 
differences can be uncovered with observable data. In fact, we find that past payment behavior 
(measure as either having paid in the previous period o having debts) tend to have an effect on how 
people react to the messages. In particular, those who had complied in the past tend to react negatively 
to the information about other people’s compliance levels.  
While our results provide novel empirical evidence about the effect of influencing taxpayers´ 
perceptions for affecting tax compliance, more in depth research is needed to understand the causal 
channels through which these effects operate. In particular, it would be relevant to disentangle the 
relative effect of the information about how to calculate fines on unpaid liabilities that was included in 
the deterrence message from the cautioning messages about the consequences of non-compliance and 
the images that were also included in the treatment. This would allow assessing what is more 
important: addressing the potential limited computational capabilities of the taxpayers or raising the 
salience of the monetary and legal consequences of non-compliance. Additionally, it may be 
important to disentangle whether the fairness message is having an effect (when it does) because of 
social norms or because it provides indirect information about stringency of enforcement by the 
government.  
Another research avenue would be to concentrate further on using this technique for 
evaluating the determinants of the individual taxpayer’s compliance decision in the standard model of 
tax evasion by concentrating on the penalty versus detection relationship (Are they substitutes? 
Complementary?). Chapter 3 attempts to provide some evidence in that direction based on the results 
of a field experiment in another municipality of Argentina, 9 de Julio.  
Finally, it may also be worth running experiments like this in contexts where additional 
information is available at the individual level, such as political preferences, to study if the moral 
suasion messages affect different people differently, particularly for those messages that appeal to 
moral arguments or could be read through a particular political lens. Moreover, combining this type of 
experiments with large-scale surveys could provide a measure of the perceptions-elasticity of 
compliance. 
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Beyond the academic interest, this chapter presents additional evidence about the important 
role of managing adequately the many opportunities that policymakers have to influence citizens’ 
beliefs and how this cheap policy alternative could yield substantive benefits to the government. In 
the case of taxation, and the fight against tax evasion, this policy alternative minimizes administrative 
costs, a feature usually ignored by the literature (Sandmo, 2005). 
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CHAPTER 3: To Monitor or to Punish? Analysis of the Effects of 
Informational Treatments on Tax Compliance in a Large Field Experiment 
 
3.1 Introduction 
What are the determinants of the individual´s decision to comply with her tax obligations? 
Economists have been attempting to answer this question since Adam Smith (1776) stated his “four 
maxims of taxation”. Yet, only in the 1970s, with the adaptation of the classic Becker (1969) ´s paper 
on crime to the economics of tax evasion by the seminal work of Allinghan and Sandmo (1972) and 
Yitzhaki (1974), economists were able to model tax compliance within the framework of the 
traditional theory of individual´s decision-making under uncertainty. Allinghman and Sandmo (1972) 
and Yitzhaki (1974) (AS-Y henceforth), portray the individual taxpayer´s decision about whether 
paying or not taxes as a gamble between the monetary benefits of evading and the monetary costs 
faced in case of detection. In their framework, the level of tax evasion depends on the probability of 
being caught and the resulting fines and legal penalties associated to non-compliance. 
As it was mentioned in Chapter 2, analyses of actual compliance and monitoring efforts by the 
government have shown that compliance is usually higher than what the standard AS-Y model would 
predict. Part of the explanation lies on the taxpayers’ intrinsic motivations to pay taxes or tax morale 
(Torgler, 2003). Part of the explanation has to do with the individual taxpayer’s perceptions about the 
salience or prominence of taxes and fines and the probability of detection and enforcement that 
influence heavily her behavioral responses to the tax code (Chetty et at, 2009; Congdon et al, 2011). 
Those perceptions are not static.  
For instance, recent theoretical work based on non-expected utility models points to the 
importance of subjective perceptions about the possibility of being caught and the level of fines in 
determining the tax compliance decision of the individual taxpayer (Hashimzade, Myles and Tran-
Nam, 2013). The results of laboratory tax experiments reviewed in Alm (2010) also show that 
individuals generally make poor predictions of the probability of detection and the magnitude of fines 
and other penalities. In turn, a growing literature provides evidence stemming from field experiments 
that taxpayers’ beliefs about the monitoring efforts of the tax authority, and consequently, their 
subjective perceptions about the probability of detection and enforcement in the case of non-
compliance, are significantly influenced by informational flows (Schawarz and Orlean, 1967; Alm et 
al, 1993; Blumenthal et al, 2001; Kleven et al, 2011; Pomeranz, 2010; Fellner et al, 2011; Sanjit and 
al-Nowaihi, 2007and 2010).  
Following this strand of the literature, in this chapter we attempt to influence taxpayers for 
increasing compliance by sending alternative messages about the level of fines and other penalties and 
monitoring and enforcement efforts by the government. By carrying out a large randomized field 
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experiment (more than 10 thousand individual taxpayers) in a municipality of Argentina, 9 de Julio, 
we can test the absolute and relative importance of information about the two traditional determinants 
of compliance in the standard AS-Y model of tax evasion (the level of fines and monitoring and 
enforcement efforts of the tax authority) on taxpayers’ behavior.  
As a motivation for the field experiment, we sketch a simple empirical model, adapted from the 
literature on signaling games and electoral outcomes (Kendall et al, 2013), to estimate the effects of 
the informational treatments on the probability of complying with the tax code of the individual 
taxpayer. Our results indicate that, relative to a control group that received a placebo message, the 
treatment that contained deterrence-based information was the most effective at influencing a higher 
level of tax compliance. More precisely, taxpayers that received that message increased tax 
compliance by around 3 percentage points with respect to the control group.  
Similar results were obtained when the taxpayer received, in addition to the deterrence message, a 
letter indicating the intensified monitoring efforts of compliance with the tax code, and hence, 
suggesting an increased probability of detection of tax cheating. Further, we find even stronger effects 
for relatively wealthier taxpayers that were not complaint with tax code in the pre-experimental 
period. Tax compliance for those taxpayers that received the deterrence-based message was 6 
percentage points higher than for the control group. The monitoring letter, in turn, had a slightly larger 
and more robustly estimated effect. 
This chapter contributes and relates to several threads of the literature. First, it provides novel 
empirical evidence to the growing body of studies about the role of information at shaping individual 
choice with respect to tax policies (Bartolome, 1995; Chetty et at, 2009; Chetty and Saez, 2010; 
Jones, 2010). This emerging set of studies suggests that policies that provide information about tax 
incentives should help individuals to make better choices (Chetty et al, 2010).  
This chapter also contributes to a specific literature that provides experimental evidence on the 
importance of information flows for influencing the individual taxpayer´s compliance decision (e.g., 
Schawarz and Orlean, 1967; Alm et al, 1993; Blumenthal et al, 2001; Kleven et al, 2011; Traxler, 
2010; Pomeranz, 2010; Fellner et al, 2011; Sanjit and al-Nowaihi, 2007and 2010) by implementing an 
empirical test of the effects of informational treatments on the traditional determinants of tax 
compliance in the standard tax evasion model. First, we provide evidence on the potential presence of 
substitution effects between deterrence-based and monitoring-based information in influencing tax 
compliance. While since the original AS-Y model of tax compliance the theoretical literature has 
leaned towards treating these instruments as perfect substitutes, there is growing body of evidence that 
suggest that the magnitude, and possibly the sign, of the compliance effects of these informational 
treatments could be different (See Section 3.2 for a review of the existing evidence). Second, we 
improve the existing methods for estimating the effects of deterrence and monitoring-based 
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informational treatments on tax compliance, first, by mitigating (at least partially) concerns about 
potential intended-to-threat (ITT) effects, and second, by sending the information to the entire 
universe of taxpayers instead to a selected sample of taxpayers as in previous studies by applying the 
empirical methods developed in Chapter 2.  
The remainder of the Chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 briefly reviews the existing 
evidence on the effects of deterrence and detection information on the compliance decision of the 
taxpayer. Section 3.3 describes the field experiment and our main results as well as some additional 
empirical analyses. Section 3.4 presents our main findings. Section 3.5, concludes and discusses some 
potential avenues for future research. 
3.2 Existing evidence 
This section presents a brief review of the existing body of evidence about the influence of 
information on fines and other penalties and the probability of detection on compliance with the tax 
code. The review is not exhaustive but it is restricted to those empirical analyses that consider only 
these two traditional determinants of tax compliance put forward by the standard AS-Y model. Thus, 
other hypotheses tested in the literature, particularly related to the use of informational treatments 
related to the concept of tax morale, are not covered here
41
. 
The early evidence 
An initial set of studies employed semi-experimental methods using instrumental variables to 
investigate the potential effects on tax compliance of raising the level of fines and the probability of 
monitoring and enforcement. Using income tax data for the United States, Witte and Woobry (1985) 
and Dubin and Wilde (1988) found a positive correlation between the risk of audit and compliance 
with the tax code. However, Pommerehn and Frey (1992), in a study of the Swiss cantons, found that, 
while intensified audit threats increases compliance, there are no significative effects of a higher level 
of fines. A limitation of these earlier studies is that they do not satisfactorily answer the 
methodological concerns stemming from the endogenous relationship between tax payments and 
income levels
42
. 
Alm (2010) reviews, in turn, the evidence stemming from laboratory experiments on tax 
compliance. He finds that nearly all experiments have found that a greater probability of detection 
leads to more compliance, although the deterrence effect weakens with higher audit rates. There is 
also experimental evidence that many individuals tend to overweight the probability of detection and 
enforcement, and hence there is more compliance than is predicted by the standard AS-Y model. This 
experimental evidence also suggests that audit rates have a greater deterrent effect than fines despite 
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 Section 2.2. in Chapter 2 provides a succinct review of the literature on tax morale.  
42
 Andreoni et al (1998) presents a through critique of the semi-experimental literature on tax compliance.  
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their theoretical equivalence in the AS-Y model. A common problem with these experimental tests is 
that they are buttressed by the typical shortcomings of laboratory experiments related the difficulties 
to generalize their findings and the artificiality of the control group
43
. 
Evidence from field experiments 
Partly as a response to the limitations of the experimental and the semi-experimental literatures, 
another set of studies employs field experimental methods to test the effects of deterrence-based 
information and monitoring-related messages. In a pioneering study, Schawarz and Orleans (1967) 
conducted a field experiment to test the impact of messages that made salient sanctions in case on 
non-compliance relative to the effects of messages with moral appeals. They found no average effects 
of the deterrence-based message on compliance. A problem with this study is the difficulty to identify 
meaningful average treatment effects due the enormous variability of the dependent variable utilized 
(e.g. monetary tax returns).  
In the same vein, Blumenthal et al (2001) informed by letter a group of 1724 randomly selected 
taxpayers in Minnesota that the income tax returns they were about to file would be closely 
monitored. Compared to a control group that did not receive this letter, low and middle-income 
taxpayers in the treatment groups on average increased tax payments compared to the previous year. 
However, the audit threat exerted the opposite effect on high income taxpayers, who reduced tax 
payments. 
Wenzel and Taylor (2004) carried out a field experiment in Australia to evaluate the influence on 
compliance of letters with warnings about the potential application of sanctions in case of inaccurate 
reporting of tax deductible expenses related to rental properties. They find no significative effects on 
the magnitude of the claims. A shortcoming of this study is that it does not separately test the potential 
effects of deterrence-based information (e.g. the warnings about the likely sanctions) and the possible 
impacts of influencing taxpayer´s subjective beliefs about the probability of detection and 
enforcement of the tax code.  
In turn, Kleven et al (2011) conducted a two-stage randomized field experiment over a 
representative sample of 40,000 taxpayers in Denmark. In the first stage, half of the population was 
randomly selected to be audited, while the rest was deliberately not audited. In the second stage, they 
sent threat-of-audit letters to a random sample in the two groups. Both the audits and the letters had a 
significant positive effect on self-reported income.  
Pomeranz (2010) analyzed how information influences tax enforcement for the Value Added 
Tax (VAT) through two randomized controlled field experiments with over 445,000 Chilean firms. 
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 See Andreoni et al (1998) for a complete review of the limitations of the tax compliance laboratory 
experiments. 
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She found in the first experiment that the impact of a random audit announcement transmitted up the 
VAT chain increases compliance by firms’ suppliers. The second experiment finds that papers trails 
acts as a substitute to firms own audit risk. Messages announcing intensified tax enforcement efforts 
had smaller effects.  
Finally, Fellner et al (2011) carried out a large field experiment with potential evaders of TV 
license fees in Austria sending different messages to taxpayers. They find a strong effect on 
compliance, particularly for a treatment aimed at raising the salience of detection risks. As mentioned 
in Chapter 2, a potential limitation of this study is that included information about fines and other 
penalties in every treatment impeding an adequate identification of the effects of the deterrence 
information. 
In the sum, the evidence stemming from empirical work in not conclusive about the effects of 
deterrence and monitoring-related informational flows on tax compliance. First, the existing studies 
do not provide definitive evidence on whether deterrence-based messages related to the salience or 
prominence of potential penalties or information about intensified monitoring and enforcement efforts 
are more effective at inducing compliant behavior. Second, the judge is still out there with respect to 
the magnitude and the sign of the effect of messages containing deterrence-based information. For 
instance, Wenzel and Taylor (2004), Schwartz and Orleans (1967) and Slemrod et al (2001) find 
mixed effects for different groups of taxpayers. Third, the existing body of evidence does not 
empirically explore the potential presence of substitution or complementary effects between these two 
policy instruments. Since the original AS-Y model the majority of the studies have threated 
deterrence-based and monitoring-based treatments as perfect substitutes, without providing a rigorous 
test for the potential presence of these substitution effects. The experimental design of the experiment 
described in this chapter has attempted to address some of these shortcomings of the existing 
literature.  
3.3 The Experiment 
The experiment was conducted in 9 de Julio, a largely rural and middle-income municipality located 
in the North-center of Argentina´s main province, Buenos Aires (see Map 4 in Appendix 3). 
Compared with average municipality in Buenos Aires, 9 de Julio is slightly less populated and 
urbanized, more educated and wealthier (Table 20).  
3.3.1 Background on the TSRU in 9 de Julio 
The main source of own revenues for the municipality collected from the individual taxpayers is 
the Urban Service Retributive Tax (Tasa Retributiva de Servicios Urbanos or henceforth TRSU by its 
Spanish acronym). The TRSU is a local tax levied upon the real state, and computed according to the 
surface and the services provided by the municipality of 9 de Julio. Taxed property includes homes, 
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farms, business premises, and most other real estate. The tax is computed taking into account the 
linear frontage, in meters, and the surface, in square meters, of the taxed real estate, the number of 
streetlights around the property, the number of paved roads around the property, and the type of street 
cleaning services it receives. Property owners are billed monthly. Taxpayers have approximately 15 
days to pay from the moment they receive the bill to the first due date. In case of payment delays, a 
cumulative compound monthly interest rate of 2% is applied to the outstanding liabilities. 
Over the last two years, tax compliance, defined as total tax payments over tax liabilities, was 
around 65% percent on average in each monthly billing cycle. Compliance has exhibited an increasing 
trend from 2010 onwards, and there is no marked seasonal behavior in the collection of the TRSU 
(See Figure 13). 
As in the Chapter 2, the unit of analysis is individual taxpayers. For each individual taxpayer we 
have collected administrative data on tax payments, dues, arrears, number of properties taxed, and 
public services provided by the Municipality for the period 2010-2012. The definition of each one of 
these variables is provided in Table 21. By August 2011, there were around 15,842 taxed units. The 
number of individual taxpayers is slightly higher than 10 thousand because a number of taxpayers 
have multiple properties.
44
 This number is equivalent to about a fifth of the population of 9 de Julio, 
according to the last 2010 Argentine census.
45  
We excluded from the sample private firms, non-governmental organizations, and other legal 
entities paying the tax.
46
  We also excluded individual taxpayers that pay their dues on a bi-monthly 
basis.
47
 
 
Taxpayers with a mailing address located in sections other than the capital of the district, that 
it is also called 9 de Julio, were also excluded. In these sections, the municipal government distributes 
the tax bill to local offices and not personally to every taxpayer. Consequently, individual taxpayers 
are required to physically attend these official premises to pick up their bill. Unfortunately, the 
municipality does not keep records about whether people collect their bills or not. Therefore, we could 
have not monitored which taxpayers had actually received the treatments. 
                                                          
44
 The municipality does not utilize an individual identification (ID) system for the TSRU (or for any of the 
local taxes). Instead, owners of each property are identified according to name and address. To circumvent this 
limitation, we applied a text recognition algorithm to the administrative data to identify individual taxpayers 
with the same name, surname and address. Then, we generated a fictitious tax ID for each TSRM’s individual 
taxpayer identified by the algorithm. Using this artificial tax ID, the population of 15,842 taxpayers originally 
encountered in the municipality’s administrative records was reduced to the around 10,300 unique individual 
taxpayers that were finally included in the experiment. 
45
 http://www.censo2010.indec.gov.ar/definitivos_bajarArchivo.asp?idc=119&arch=x  
46
 For example, the bill may be received by a clerk who had been instructed in advance by the firm´s owner 
about whether to pay the bill or not. 
47
 While the tax is levied over a monthly billing period, the Municipality also allows taxpayers to pay it on a 
yearly or bi-monthly basis. However, only around 14% of the taxpayers select either modality. They were 
excluded because the experiment was carried out in a month (August) in which bi-monthly and annual bills were 
not distributed. 
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3.3.2 The treatments 
With the objective of raising compliance with the tax and testing the relative importance of the 
determinants of tax evasion, the Municipality of 9 de Julio agreed to send a message and a notification 
letter attached to the tax bill of the TRSU through a randomized control trial (RCT). The causal 
mechanism was to change taxpayers’ beliefs regarding the level of the penalties for evasion and the 
monitoring efforts of compliance with the tax code. As in the field experiment presented in Chapter 2, 
the wording of the message and the letter and the selection of the image was prepared by a 
communications team in conversations with the municipal authorities. It was also influenced by the 
experience collected in a previous experiment through the use of a focus group as well as in the field 
experiment presented in Chapter 2. We describe below the treatment message and the letter as well as 
the placebo message.  
Deterrence message 
The first treatment, a message attached on top of the tax bill similar to the one used in the experiment 
described in Chapter 2, provided taxpayers with a simplified example about the costs of non-
compliance, which indicated how much the cost a hypothetical debt of AR$ 1,000 would be after a 
year (given a cumulative monthly interest rate of 2%). Specifically, the message stated that, for a 
liability of such amount, the taxpayer would have to pay AR$ 269 in arrears. The message also 
warned the taxpayers that the municipality would take administrative actions in case of non-
compliance.  
An image of a judicial hammer was also included in the message attached to the tax bill with the 
intention of reinforcing the deterrence message. Image 4 in the Annex 2 provides a sample of a 
message (in Spanish) and the text translated to English. The message was also signed by the 
Undersecretary of Revenue and Control of the municipality with the purpose of personalizing the 
message.  
The aim of the message was raising the salience of the consequences of non-compliance by 
simplifying the calculation of arrears and unpaid tax liabilities using the compounded interest rate, 
and highlighting the probability of administrative and legal sanctions for non-compliers. As 
mentioned above in Chapter 2, the literature on tax compliance that incorporates the insights of 
behavioral economics points to the importance of limited computational capabilities, particularly in 
face of relatively complex intertemporal tax calculations for explaining taxpayers´ responses to fines 
and other penalties. This literature also suggests that, in the presence of taxpayers with limited 
attention, raising the salience of fines and legal actions in the case of non-compliance might have an 
effect on individual behavior with respect to tax payments (Congdon et al, 2011; Bernheim and 
Rangel, 2007 and 2009).  
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Monitoring letter 
The second treatment consisted of a notification letter addressed to every individual taxpayer. The 
letter was designed following some of the recommendations commonly found in the behavioral 
economics literature: (a) the text was written in a clear and concise manner with the key ideas 
included in the first paragraph; (b) the language used was personalized and colloquial; (b) it was 
address to the taxpayer by her name and surname; (c) it was signed by and included the complete 
name of the Undersecretary of Public Revenues and Control; (d) it also included an image placed on 
the right of the written text; and, (e) it used bold letters to highlight some key words and phrases 
(Kaheman, 2011). 
In the letter’s header, a title with a text in caps and bold letters was also included aimed at 
emphasizing the local government’s intensified monitoring efforts on TRSU’s compliance. The key 
messages were also highlighted in the main text of the letter using also bold letters with the intention 
to attract taxpayer’s attention. An image of a magnifying glass was also included in the letter with the 
purpose of reinforcing the monitoring message. Image 5 in the Annex 2 provides an example of a 
notification letter (in Spanish) and the text of the message in English. Like the deterrence message, 
the monitoring letter was also signed by the Undersecretary of Revenues and Control. 
The goal of the notification letter was to influence the individual taxpayers’ subjective perceptions 
about the monitoring efforts of the municipality on the TRSU’s compliance, and therefore, her 
subjective beliefs about the probability of enforcement in the case of non-compliance. As it was 
already mentioned in the introduction of this chapter and in Section 3.2 above, a growing literature 
provides evidence on the effects of informational flows on influencing taxpayer’s priors about the 
probability of being detected when tax cheating (Blumenthal et al, 1995; Kleven et al, 2011; 
Pomeranz, 2010; Fellner et al, 2011).  
Interaction treatment 
Taxpayers in this treatment group received simultaneously the deterrence message in the tax bill and 
the notification letter with the monitoring message. The aim of this treatment was to test the impact of 
simultaneously influencing the taxpayer’s subjective perceptions about the consequences of non-
compliance in terms of fines and other penalties, and intensified monitoring efforts on behalf of the 
local tax authorities, and the resulting increased probability of detection. The combination of 
treatments could allow us to evaluate the complementarity or substitutability of the determinants of 
tax evasion. 
Placebo message 
In order to make sure that any potential effects would come from the contents of the messages and not 
from receiving a message, the control group of taxpayers received a placebo message attached to the 
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tax bill. The message urged 9 de Julio’s taxpayers to collaborate in maintaining the municipality clean 
and tidy. This message was the same that the one the municipality had been sending for the last four 
years to the entire population of TRSU’s taxpayers. Image 6 in the Annex 2 provides a sample of a 
message (in Spanish) and the text translated to English. 
3.3.3 Implementation and Summary Statistics 
As in Chapter 2 (see Section 2.3), we implemented a stratified or block randomization strategy 
due to the presence of highly correlated observable characteristics for some groups of taxpayers
48
. 
Specifically, we use the number of properties (a proxy for taxpayer’s income) and the outcome 
variable prior to the experiment to define four strata or blocks: (1) non-compliant taxpayers with one 
taxed property; (2) non-compliant taxpayers with multiple (more than one) taxed property; (3) 
compliant taxpayers with one taxed property; and, (4) compliant taxpayers with multiple taxed 
properties.  
Within each block, the same proportion of taxpayers was randomly assigned to either the 
treatment groups or the control group. Thus, forty percent of the taxpayers were randomly assigned to 
the control group, and the remaining sixty percent was equally distributed to each of the treatment 
groups within each strata. The exclusion of the districts outside the capital city of the municipality 
from the experiment due to assignment concerns precluded us from using the geographical location of 
the taxpayers to define the blocks (See Section 2.3.1). 
In order to ensure the right balance across groups, and following the same balancing strategy 
pursued in Chapter 2 (see Section 2.3), we ran the randomization 1000 times and selected the random 
draw that showed the best balance for all the pre-experimental covariates (including the pre-
experimental outcome variable) controlling for the strata dummies. The final draw was selected 
according to two criteria: (a) the minimum statistical difference between treatment and control for 
draws statistically significant at a five percent or lower; and, (b) the minimum maximum t-stat (Bruhn 
and McKenzie, 2008). 
The tax bills with the treatment message and the notification letter were sent in July 2012, 
affecting payments due in the August billing period of the same year. Table 23 presents summary 
statistics for the three treatment groups, compared to the control group in the pre-experimental August 
2011-January 2012 billing period. As expected, given the randomized design of the experiment, 
average characteristics in the groups assigned to the different treatments look very similar: none of the 
differences between treatment and control groups are statistically significant at the 5% level. Most 
                                                          
48
 For instance, the calculation of a simple measure of intra-section correlation yields a coefficient of 0.5 for the 
one-month-lagged outcome (the taxpayer paid 100% or more of her tax liabilities) and 0.3 for the number of 
taxed properties.  
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importantly, there are no statistically significant differences among the groups in terms of the 
dependent variable. 
Table 23 also indicates that previous to the experiment, around 65 percent of taxpayers had paid 
the liabilities for the period in full and made additional payments during the period, such as advanced 
payments or paying down their debt. Also, the typical individual taxpayer owned more than one 
property of 16 linear front meters. Finally, we also include in the Table 23 the balance of 
randomization for the public services variables in the period in which we conducted the experiment 
(August, 2012) to show that no public works affected the groups differentially. 
As in the case of the experiment presented in Chapter 2, we carried a set of actions aimed at 
ensuring an appropriate implementation of the randomized design of the experiment. First, we sent to 
the local authorities, three weeks before the distribution of the tax bills, a file with a code assigning 
each taxpayer to either the treatment groups or the control. Based on that codification, the 
Municipality generated an administrative record that we compared against our files in order to detect 
and correct any mistakes with randomization. Second, we also conducted, one week before the bills 
were finally distributed, a physical check with a random sample of 1,000 printed bills at the 
Municipality in 9 de Julio. No assignment errors were found in this final control. Finally, we 
randomly assigned the tax bills with the messages to the municipal officials in charge of the 
distribution.  
3.3.4 Empirical model 
In this section, we present an empirical model of the effects of the informational treatments on tax 
compliance adapted from recent work on signalling games and electoral outcomes (Kendall et at, 
2013). Consider an individual taxpayer i for which her expected utility is defined by her income EUi 
(Yi). There is also a tax liability T and a fine d that is calculated as a percentage of the tax liability. 
Therefore, the penalty F the taxpayer pays in case of non-compliance is T(1+d). Taxpayers have only 
imperfect information about the fines and other related penalties as well as the monitoring efforts of 
the tax authority M, and hence on the probability of detection p of tax cheating and enforcement of the 
tax code. 
The experimental treatments described in Section 4.4. induce a randomized change in the 
information available to taxpayers about the salience or prominence of penalties and the subjective 
probability of detection and enforcement. Therefore, the randomized strategy creates four groups of 
taxpayers according to the informational treatment they receive: 
Deterrence: Receiving a message about F (the penalty in case of non-compliance) 
Monitoring: Receiving a message (a letter) about C (the monitoring efforts of the tax 
authority), and hence the probability of detection and enforcement of the tax code p.  
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Deterrence + Monitoring: Receiving a message about both F and C 
Placebo: Receiving a placebo message not related to either F or C. 
A message denotes having received a randomly assigned treatment with information on penalties, 
monitoring, penalties and monitoring or a placebo message, M{1,…,4}. Therefore, we can define T(m) 
as the group of taxpayers treated with information type M=m and b
i
F,p (F, p|M=m) as the post-
experimental subjective beliefs of taxpayer i treated with message m about the consequences of non-
compliance F and the probability of detection of non-compliant behavior p.  
Similarly to Chetty et al (2009), the taxpayer i only observes the tax liability T when she decides 
to comply with the tax code. The penalty F is computed by the tax authority once the taxpayer already 
evades her tax obligations and is detected (or alternatively decides to comply for any other reasons). 
Therefore, the message m can be seen as informational treatment aimed at raising the salience or 
prominence of fines and other related penalties. 
We further assume that the potential outcome of taxpayers (e.g. paying their tax liabilities) that 
received the placebo message (M=4) is unaffected by the treatment assignment of the rest of the 
taxpayer’s population. Hence, the post-experimental subjective beliefs in this group of taxpayers 
about penalties and the probability of detection and enforcement of the tax code are identical to their 
post-experimental beliefs (see Kendall et al, 2013).  
The taxpayer’s problem is dichotomous: whether or not to comply with the tax code. If the 
taxpayer complies with her tax obligations, her utility equals her gross income minus the tax liability 
or Y-T. On the contrary, if she decides to evade her liabilities there are two potential states of the 
world in terms of her expected income utility. First, the expected income utility of successful or 
undetected evasion or EUSE for taxpayer i, treated by m is: 
    
 (     ( )  ( ))  ∑∑
  
   
 (       ) [(   )( )(  )] 
Instead, if the tax authority detects the non-compliant behavior and enforces the tax code or 
unsuccessful or detected evasion EUUE, the expected income utility for taxpayer i treated by message 
m is: 
    
 (     ( )  ( ))  ∑∑
  
   
 (       ) [ ( )(    ( ))] 
Similarly to the standard AS-Y model of tax compliance, the probability that taxpayer i with 
information m complies with her monies is given by   [   
 (    )     
 (   ( ))(  )  
 ( )(    ( ))] (Allingham and Sadmo, 1972; Sadmo, 2005). In other words, the taxpayer will 
evade her tax liabilities if the monetary gains of evading are larger than the benefits from complying 
with the tax code. 
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We empirically estimate the casual effects of the informational treatments m (e.g. the deterrence 
message, the monitoring letter and the interaction treatment) on the probability of complying with the 
tax code Pr using a standard probability or probit model. The randomized design of the field 
experiment ensures there is no selection bias in the construction of the treatment and the control 
groups (Dufflo et al, 2008; Angrist and Prischke, 2009). Formally, we estimate the following 
specification:  
    (    )   (                                                               ) ( ) 
Where Y is the binary outcome variable equal to one if the individual taxpayer i meets her tax 
obligations and/or makes any additional payments (e.g. debts and advanced payments) in the August 
billing period; Deterrence is a binary variable equal to one if the taxpayer receives a deterrence 
message with her tax bill; Monitoring is a binary variable equal to one if the taxpayer receives a letter 
attached to the tax bill with information conveying intensified monitoring efforts on TRSU’s 
compliance from the municipality; Deterrence*Monitoring is a binary variable equivalent to one if the 
taxpayer receives both the message and the letter; X is a vector of control variables comprising 
taxpayer´s observable characteristics (e.g. number of properties) and the amount and type of public 
services provided by the municipality (e.g. provision of paved roads, streetlights and street cleaning 
services); and   is an individually and identically distributed (i.i.d) error term. As in the Chapter 2, we 
include the lagged outcome variable as an additional control to avoid potential serial correlation 
concerns, mainly because there is high persistence on payment behavior (Duflo et al (2008).  
3.4 Results 
In this section, we present the results of the empirical analysis. Table 24 presents the results of the 
average treatment effects (ATE) of receiving any message (e.g. a deterrence message and/or a 
monitoring letter), using the empirical model described in equation (1). The table shows marginal the 
effects computed at the mean and robust standard errors are displayed in parentheses. The evidence 
shows that receiving a treatment message and/or a letter increased the probability of complying with 
the TRSU by 3 percentage points with respect to the control group that received a placebo message at 
the 1% significance level.  
The magnitude of the coefficient is even larger, and remains robustly significant at the 1% level, 
when we include the control variables in Column (2): the pre-experimental outcome variable, the first 
principal component of the public services provided by the municipality and the number of taxed 
properties. Interestingly, the probability of payment seems to be negatively correlated to the number 
of taxpayers’ properties. In Chapter 2, we find similar results in a field experiment carried out in a 
relatively larger and more urbanized municipality than 9 de Julio. This result also relates to the 
standard AS-Y model that establishes a positive relation between taxpayer´s income and tax 
avoidance (Sandmo and Allingham, 1972; Sandmo, 2005). Contrastingly, the supply and quality of 
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locally provided public services does not seem to be correlated with tax compliance. Expectedly, the 
inclusion of block-fixed effects increases the precision of our estimates while maintains the direction 
and statistical significance of the message and interaction coefficients.  
Table 25 explores the potential marginal effects of the deterrence message, the monitoring letter 
and the interaction treatment (the group of taxpayers that received simultaneously the message and the 
letter). The first set of regressions (baseline) includes the three treatment messages, the lagged 
outcome variable, and block-level fixed effects. The second set of regressions (controls) includes also 
the principal component of the variables for public service provision (paved roads, street cleaning and 
street lightning services during the period), the (log of the) number of properties that each taxpayer 
has, and the (log of the) average tax liability.  
The first set of regressions show that the deterrence message had a larger effect on tax compliance 
than the ATE of receiving a message and/or a letter. The deterrence message increases the probability 
of complying with the tax code by a maximum of 5 percentage points at the 1% significance level in 
the second set of regressions that includes the control covariates as well as block fixed effects. In 
contrast, the monitoring letter does not seem to have a statistically significative effect. Still, tax 
compliance for taxpayers that received both the deterrence message and the monitoring letter is 2-3 
percentage points higher than the counterfactual, depending on the specification, albeit the coefficient 
is imprecisely estimated at a lower significance level. Full regression tables are provided in Table 8 in 
the Appendix 4. 
As in the field experiment presented in Chapter 2, a potential concern with the results 
presented in Table 25 is that some of the taxpayers may have not read the messages, and therefore 
were not treated, introducing a downward bias in our estimates. In particular, there is a group, the 
“unrecoverable debtors”, defined as taxpayers that did not registered any payments on their TSRU 
liabilities between 2010 and 2012, who are more likely to ignore the messages included in the bill. To 
investigate this potential concern, we estimate in the specifications (6) to (8) in the Table 25 the same 
empirical model as before but excluding the taxpayers that were unrecoverable debtors by January, 
2012 from the sample. The estimations show a slightly larger effect of the deterrence message 
treatment on tax compliance, suggesting that we could be in fact underestimating its impact due to the 
presence of a potential intended-to-treat (ITT) downward bias (Dufflo et al 2008; Angrist and 
Prischke, 2008). Table 26 shows that this change in the magnitude of the deterrence message 
coefficient is not driven by a potential bias in the underlining distribution of taxpayers amongst 
treatments and control groups. The balancing between the treatment messages and the control group 
remains virtually unchanged when unrecoverable debtors are excluded from the sample.  
To provide some intuition for the findings in terms of revenues collected instead of individual 
level decisions, Figure 14 plots the tax compliance ratio –computed as tax payments over tax 
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liabilities-, for the three treatment groups and the control group in August. It also displays –in a solid 
line- the average tax compliance ratio prior to the experiment (January 2012) as well as –in a dotted 
line- the average tax compliance ratio in the same period (August) but one year before (2011). This 
figure suggests that tax compliance for taxpayers that received the deterrence message was 3 
percentage points higher than for taxpayers in the control group (that received a placebo message). 
This difference is statistically significant according to a nonparametric test of proportions. Further, 
while the monitoring letter by itself does not seem to have any effect, tax compliance for taxpayers 
that simultaneously received both the deterrence message and the monitoring letter is around 3 
percentage points higher than for the control group that received the placebo message.  
Table 27 benefits from the block or stratified strategy of the field experiment described in Section 
4.4 to investigate the potential presence of heterogeneous treatment effects across different groups of 
taxpayers defined by (the log) of the number of properties and compliance status with the tax code 
prior to the experiment (January, 2012). We include in all the regressions the same c ontrols as before 
and block-fixed effects. Columns (1) and (2) estimate the probit model described in equation (1) for 
taxpayers with one registered taxed property and that complied and violated the tax code one year 
before the experiment, respectively. Columns (3) and (4), in turn, show the results for taxpayers with 
multiple properties that complied and violated the tax code prior to the experiment, respectively. 
The estimations presented in Column (1) show that tax compliance for non-compliant taxpayers 
with one taxed property and that received a deterrence treatment message was 4 percentage points 
higher than the control group that received the placebo message. Still, the coefficient is imprecisely 
estimated at the 10% significance level. The monitoring-based letter, in turn, had a larger effect than 
the deterrence-based message on the probability of complying with the tax code (6 percentage points) 
at the 5% significance level. Taxpayers in this group that received both the letter and the message 
increased the probability of payment by 5 percentage points relative to the counterfactual. In contrast, 
there are no significative effects of the message, the letter or the interaction treatment on compliance 
for compliant taxpayers with a single taxed property. 
We find even stronger effects for non-compliant taxpayers with more than one taxed property. 
Tax compliance for those taxpayers in this group that received the deterrence treatment message was 
6 percentage points higher than for the control group, albeit at the 10% significance level. The 
monitoring letter, in turn, had a lightly larger and more robustly estimated effect at the 5% 
significance level. There are no significative effects of the interaction treatment for these taxpayers. 
There were also no effects of neither of the treatments on compliant taxpayers with multiple 
properties.  
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3.5 Conclusions and further research directions 
The AS-Y standard model of tax compliance postulates two main drivers behind the individual’s 
taxpayer decision to comply with the tax code: on the one hand, her subjective perception of the 
monitoring efforts, and the resultant probability of detection of non-compliant behavior by the tax 
authorities, and on the other hand, the fines and other legal and administrative punishments that she 
may receive in the case of not paying her monies.  
In this chapter, we present the results of a large randomized field experiment designed to 
empirically evaluate the relative importance of the deterrence information with respect to 
informational flows related to intensified monitoring efforts on behalf of the tax authority on 
determining compliance of a locally levied tax in a municipality of Argentina. We find that a 
deterrence-based message had a large average treatment effect on tax compliance, whereas the 
monitoring-based letter did not have a statistically significative impact. Only combined with the 
deterrence message, the letter with information on the intensified monitoring efforts of the local 
authorities on non-compliant behavior posit a positive effect on compliance with the tax code. 
We also find heterogeneous treatment effects for different groups of taxpayers classified by 
compliance status (e.g. whether or not the taxpayer complied with the tax code prior to the 
experiment) and a proxy for income (e.g. the log of the pre-experimental number of taxed properties). 
The deterrence-based message exerts a larger impact on the compliance behavior of relatively well-off 
and non-compliant taxpayers. In turn, the provision of information on intensified compliance 
monitoring and tax enforcement efforts aimed at influencing taxpayer’s subjective beliefs about the 
probability of detection of tax cheating had also a slightly larger effect on this group of taxpayers.  
While the results presented in this chapter shed new light on the relative importance of the 
determinants of tax compliance in the standard AS-Y model, more in depth research is required to 
understand how information influences the compliance choice of the individual taxpayer. A research 
avenue worth following is to explore the relative importance of images with respect to written 
messages at influencing compliance by randomly assigning treatment messages with and without 
images. While evidence suggests that the use of visual images in written communications can 
contribute to the reader´s remembering and understanding of the text, it also indicates that images can 
also distract the attention of the reader from the text (Glenberg and Langton, 1992). Another 
interesting research direction would be to analyze the effects on compliance with the tax code of 
different levels of enforcement threat throughout the use of alternative written communications and 
images in the detection-based treatment messages. While non-expected utility models suggest that 
subjective perceptions about the probability of detection and enforcement of the tax code may differ 
across taxpayers, there have not been systematic attempts in the literature to test this result empirically 
(Hashimzade et al, 2013). Finally, it would also be interesting to empirically analyze whether the 
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effects of the informational treatments on the compliance decision of the taxpayer persist over time 
(and for how long) once the messages have been removed from the bill.  
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Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1: Tariff schedule valid since November 1st, 2008 
Category 
Accumulated consumption 
(m
3
/year) 
 
Unit price per m
3
 
From To 
R1 0 500  
 
0.144 
R21 501 650 
R22 651 800 
R23 801 1000 0.156 
R31 1001 1250 0.247 
R32 1251 1500 0.332 
R33 1501 1800 0.437 
R34 1801 ∞ 0.517 
 
Notes: The econometric analysis focuses on the discontinuity between the 
categories R32 and R33. 
 
Table 2: Socioeconomic characteristics of 
households in the estimation sample 
 
Variable 
 
Estimation 
sample survey 
Household 
Survey 
Female 75.4 52.0 
Age 52.5 32.1 
Married 60.8 38.6 
Tertiary education 38.0 19.4 
Home owner 88.9 71.2 
Number of rooms 3.3 3.1 
Number of families 1.1 1.0 
 
Notes: Individual characteristics in the estimation sample survey are from the 
member of the household that is responsible for paying the gas bills. Statistics 
on households from Argentina's Household Survey (Encuesta Permanente de 
Hogares) refer to households living in Buenos Aires. “Number of families” 
refers to the number of different families living in the household. “Number of 
rooms” refers to the total number of rooms in the household. 
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Table 3: Knowledge on bill amount and price 
determination mechanism 
 
Last amount billed 
Question % Yes  
Do you remember the amount of your last bill? 91.8  
Price determination mechanism – Perceived knowledge 
Question % Yes  
Do you know how the total amount of the bill is computed? 30.7  
Price determination mechanism – Objective knowledge 
Question  Correct Answer % Correct 
Answer 
 
How often does the company re-categorize 
consumers? 
Every billing period 14.4  
Re-categorization is calculated based on… Last year’s consumption 38.9  
What is the consumption level that divides 
categories R32 and R33 
1500 m
3
 3.7  
Notes: Results from a phone survey of 353 customers that had an annual accumulated consumption between 1480 and 1520 
m3 in the bill issued in May 2009. For the questions about objective knowledge, four alternatives were presented. In the 
question “How often the company re-categorize consumers?” the options were: a) every billing period, b) every two billing 
periods, c) every six billing periods, d) other. In the question “Re-categorization is calculated based on …” the options were: 
a) difference in consumption between the current bill and the previous; b) last year’s consumption; c) last semester 
consumption; d) other. In the question “What is the consumption level that divides categories R32 and R33” the options 
were: a) 1000 m3; b) 2000 m3; c) 1,500 m3; d) Does not know. 
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Table 4: Dates and periods by treatment status 
(Days normalized: May 1st, 2009 = Day 1) 
 
  Treatment  Control  Raw Difference Adjusted 
Difference 
Panel A: Dates 
 Final 
Measurement 
Period 0 
10.93 
(0.14) 
10.77 
(0.11) 
0.17 
(0.17) 
0.27 
(0.29) 
 Bill Period 0 
(Treatment Date) 
17.07 
(0.13) 
16.91 
(0.12) 
0.16 
(0.18) 
0.30 
(0.30) 
 Final 
Measurement 
Period 1 
71.62 
(0.13) 
71.45 
(0.12) 
0.17 
(0.17) 
0.31 
(0.29) 
Panel B: Days Between Bill Period 0 and Final Measurement Period 1 
 Days  54.55 
(0.02) 
54.54 
(0.03) 
0.01 
(0.03) 
0.01 
(0.03) 
      
Panel C: Days Between Final Measurement in Period 0 and Period 1 
 Days  60.69     
(0.02) 
60.68   
(0.02) 
0.00 
(0.03) 
0.04 
(0.06) 
      
Notes: Means and standard errors in parentheses. Sample includes all customers with accumulated annual consumption 
between 1480 and 1520 m3 in the bill that was issued in May, 2009. Period 0 corresponds to the one whose bill was issued in 
May 2009. Dates in the table are normalized so May 1st, 2009 corresponds to day 1. Day 11 = May 11th, 2009. Day 17 = 17th 
May, 2009. Day 72 = July 12th, 2009. Standard errors clustered by accumulated consumption in Period 0. 
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Table 5: Region of residence by treatment status 
  Treatment Control Raw Difference Adjusted 
Difference 
  Quilmes  0.172 
(0.004) 
0.171 
(0.009) 
0.001     
(0.010) 
0.000 
(0.014) 
  Avellaneda  0.119 
(0.006) 
0.134 
(0.006) 
-0.015* 
(0.008) 
-0.016 
(0.014) 
  Ate. Brown  0.126 
(0.005) 
0.113 
(0.004) 
 0.013*     
(0.006) 
0.005 
(0.011) 
  Flores   0.092 
(0.004) 
0.090 
(0.004) 
 0.002     
(0.006) 
0.003 
(0.008) 
  E. Echeverría  0.092 
(0.004) 
0.087 
(0.005) 
0.005     
(0.006) 
0.016* 
(0.009) 
  Belgrano  0.069 
(0.004) 
0.077 
(0.005) 
 -0.007     
(0.006) 
-0.009 
(0.013) 
  Floresta  0.060 
(0.004) 
0.066 
(0.004) 
-0.005     
(0.006) 
0.001 
(0.010) 
  Devoto  0.064 
(0.003) 
0.054 
(0.004) 
0.010*     
(0.005) 
-0.005 
(0.011) 
  Norte  0.045 
(0.004) 
0.054 
(0.003) 
-0.009*    
(0.005) 
-0.014 
(0.011) 
  Other  0.160 
(0.006) 
0.154 
(0.005) 
0.006     
(0.008) 
0.019 
(0.014) 
Notes: Means and standard errors in parenthesis. The Raw Difference column reports mean difference between 
the Treatment and Control groups. The Adjusted Difference column presents the coefficient of regressing the 
respective variable on a dummy for treatment and a linear term for annual accumulated consumption by Period 
0. Standard errors clustered by accumulated consumption in Period 0. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The 
Other category includes Almagro, Mataderos, Centro, Lomas de Zamora, Barracas, Lanús, San Vicente and 
Berazategui. 
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Table 6: Consumption levels and ratios to 
accumulated consumption by treatment status 
  Treatment Control Raw Difference Adjusted 
Difference 
Consumption Levels (m
3
) 
 Period -5   456.378 
(1.469)  
 450.914 
(1.714)  
5.464** 
(2.230) 
3.922 
(4.423) 
 Period -4  464.935 
(1.927)  
  456.953 
(1.414)  
7.982*** 
(2.360) 
-1.592 
(5.062) 
 Period -3   243.048 
(1.576)  
 242.274 
(1.391)  
 0.774 
(2.076) 
-7.062* 
(3.526) 
 Period -2  110.743 
(0.970)  
 107.277 
(0.809)  
 3.466*** 
(1.247) 
2.760 
(2.933) 
 Period -1   96.448 
(1.293)  
 96.001 
(0.940)  
 0.447 
(1.579) 
6.835 
(4.075) 
 Period 0  140.970 
(1.046)  
138.733 
(1.008)  
2.237 
(1.435) 
-0.630 
(3.080) 
Ratio of Consumption in a Period and Annual Accumulated Consumption by Period 0 
 Period -5 0.302 
(0.001) 
0.303 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.002) 
0.003 
(0.003) 
 Period -4 0.308 
(0.001) 
0.307 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.003) 
 Period -3 0.161 
(0.001) 
0.163 
(0.001) 
-0.002 
(0.001) 
-0.004 
(0.002) 
 Period -2 0.073 
(0.001) 
0.072 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.002 
(.002) 
 Period -1 0.064 
(0.001) 
0.064 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
0.005 
(0.003) 
 Period 0 0.093 
(0.001) 
0.093 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.002) 
Notes: Means and standard errors in parenthesis. The Raw Difference column reports mean difference between the 
Treatment and Control groups. The Adjusted Difference column presents the coefficient of regressing the respective variable 
on a dummy for treatment and a linear term for annual accumulated consumption by Period 0. Standard errors clustered by 
accumulated consumption in Period 0. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 7: Bill amount by treatment status 
  Treatment Control Raw Difference Adjusted 
Difference 
 Period -5  101.380 
(0.305)  
 100.558 
(0.288)  
 0.822* 
(0.414) 
0.678 
(0.731) 
 Period -4   138.959 
(1.127)  
  134.761  
(0.679)  
 4.198*** 
(1.384) 
3.658 
(3.034) 
 Period -3  51.406 
(0.350)  
52.004 
(0.363)  
 -0.598 
(0.498) 
-2.473*** 
(0.891) 
 Period -2  42.233 
(0.376)  
 41.255 
(0.277)  
0.978 
(0.461) 
-0.560 
(0.795) 
 Period -1   82.449 
(0.512)  
79.348 
(0.403)  
3.101 
(0.643) 
1.299 
(1.816) 
 Period 0    91.728 
(0.565) 
72.336 
(0.436) 
19.393*** 
(0.704) 
17.965*** 
(1.474) 
Notes: Means and standard errors in parenthesis. Bill amounts are in Argentine Pesos. The Raw Difference column reports 
mean difference between the Treatment and Control groups. The Adjusted Difference column presents the coefficient of 
regressing the respective variable on a dummy for treatment and a linear term for annual accumulated consumption by 
Period 0. Standard errors clustered by accumulated consumption in Period 0. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 8: Impacts of price increase in bill 0 on consumption in period 1, alternative functional forms 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Treatment 
-15.901** 
(6.491) 
-15.266** 
(5.929) 
-15.577** 
(6.153) 
-15.597* 
(9.194) 
-16.539* 
(9.201) 
-14.595 
(9.917) 
-16.516* 
(9.174) 
-17.126 
(12.408) 
AAC 
0.720** 
(0.290) 
1.004** 
(0.412) 
0.707** 
(0.272) 
2.201 
(1.441) 
0.812 
(0.702) 
7.515** 
(2.872) 
0.811 
(0.696) 
2.352 
(5.143) 
AAC * Treatment  
-0.619 
(0.531) 
 
-2.777 
(1.968) 
 
-12.721*** 
(3.936) 
 
-2.244 
(8.023) 
AAC 
2
    
-0.011 
(0.012) 
0.059 
(0.069) 
-0.011 
(0.012) 
0.738** 
(0.356) 
-0.012 
(0.044) 
-0.487 
(1.014) 
AAC 
2
 *Treatment    
-0.014 
(0.090) 
 
-0.149 
(0.465) 
 
-0.009 
(1.619) 
AAC 
3
      
-0.000 
(0.002) 
0.023* 
(0.012) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.074 
(0.079) 
AAC 
3
 *Treatment      
-0.040** 
(0.015) 
 
0.136 
(0.121) 
AAC 
4
        
0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
AAC 
4
 *Treatment        
0.001 
(0.003) 
Constant 
433.271*** 
(3.299) 
436.134*** 
(3.992) 
434.620*** 
(3.539) 
439.962*** 
(6.161) 
435.079*** 
(4.700) 
447.792*** 
(6.506) 
435.135*** 
(5.037) 
443.718*** 
(8.874) 
         
N 7190 7190 7190 7190 7190 7190 7190 7190 
R-squared 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002 
Notes: The dependent variable is consumption in Period 1. Average of the dependent variable is 425.49. The estimation method is OLS. Standard errors clustered by accumulated consumption 
in Period 0.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Table 9: Impacts of price increase in bill 0 on consumption in Period 1, alternative bandwidths 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Treatment 
-15.901** 
(6.491) 
-15.266** 
(5.929) 
-16.296* 
(8.105) 
-14.780** 
(6.882) 
-18.863* 
(10.386) 
-15.872* 
(8.484) 
-16.091 
(13.525) 
-13.176 
(11.124) 
AAC 
0.720** 
(0.290) 
1.004** 
(0.412) 
0.759 
(0.451) 
1.443** 
(0.612) 
1.060 
(0.832) 
2.403** 
(0.863) 
0.703 
(1.774) 
1.898 
(2.309) 
AAC * 
Treatment 
 
-0.619 
(0.531) 
 
-1.522* 
(0.782) 
 
-3.134** 
(1.333) 
 
-3.220 
(2.821) 
Constant 
433.271*** 
(3.299) 
436.134*** 
(3.992) 
433.000*** 
(4.042) 
438.133*** 
(4.647) 
435.086*** 
(5.287) 
441.855*** 
(5.386) 
438.154*** 
(7.297) 
441.205*** 
(8.397) 
Bandwidth 20 20 15 15 10 10 5 5 
         
N 7190 7190 5417 5417 3679 3679 1946 1946 
R-squared 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002 
Notes: The dependent variable is consumption in Period 1. The bandwidths determine the range of normalized annual accumulated consumption used to select observations for a particular 
regression. For example, in Columns (1) and (2) only individuals with normalized annual accumulated consumption between [-20, 20] are included. Average of the dependent variable is 425.49. 
The estimation method is OLS. Standard errors clustered by accumulated consumption in Period 0.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 10: Exploiting placebo AAC thresholds to test for 
mean reversion 
 (1) 
AAC ≥ -10 
-1.646 
(6.250) 
AAC ≥ 0 
-16.969** 
 (7.209) 
AAC ≥ 10 
-3.129 
(6.383) 
AAC 
0.890 
(0.531) 
Constant 
435.767*** 
(7.941) 
  
N 7190 
R-squared 0.001 
Notes: The dependent variable is consumption in Period 1. Explanatory variables include 
indicators for annual accumulated consumption (AAC) higher than -10, 0 and 10 and also AAC 
as a continuous variable. Individuals with normalized annual accumulated consumption between 
[-20, 20] are included. Average of the dependent variable is 425.49. The estimation method is 
OLS. Standard errors clustered by accumulated consumption in Period 0.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, 
* p<0.1. 
 
 
 
 
  
-80- 
 
 
 
Table 11: Differential effects across consumers in the 
treatment group by distance to the threshold 
 (1) 
Close 
-16.339** 
(6.567) 
Far 
-18.500* 
(9.458) 
AAC 
0.794** 
(0.374) 
Constant 
434.015*** 
(3.835) 
  
N 7190 
R-squared 0.001 
Notes: The dependent variable is consumption in Period 1. Explanatory variables 
include indicators for normalized annual accumulated between 1 and 10 (Close) 
and between 11 and 20 (Far) and 10 and also AAC as a continuous variable. 
Individuals with normalized annual accumulated consumption between [-20, 20] 
are included. Average of the dependent variable is 425.49. The estimation method 
is OLS. Standard errors clustered by accumulated consumption in Period 0.*** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Figure 1. . Dates by annual accumulated consumption 
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Dates in the figure are normalized so December 1st, 2008 corresponds to day 0.
Figure 1: Dates by annual accumulated consumption
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Figure 1 (cont.): Dates by annual accumulated consumption 
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Figure 1 (cont.): Dates by annual accumulated consumption
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Figure 2: Region of residence by annual accumulated consumption (by six 
largest regions in terms of number of users) 
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Figure 2: Region of residence by annual accumulated consumption
(by six largest regions in terms of number of users)
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Figure 3: Ratio of consumption to annual accumulated consumption in period 
0 
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Figure 3: Ratio of consumption to annual accumulated
consumption in period 0
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Figure 4: Average bill by annual accumulated consumption 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Number of Observations by annual accumulated consumption in 
period 0 
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Figure 6: Average consumption in July 2009 by annual accumulated 
consumption (in m3) 
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by annual accumulated consumption (in m3)
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Table 12: Socio-economic Characteristics of Junin and the Province of Buenos 
Aires 
 
Notes: (1) Percentage of the population between 5 and 18 years old, attending any type of school 
Source: own elaboration based on Ministry of Interior of Argentina, National Censuses of 2001 and 2010, Provincial Bureau 
of Statistics and Tribunal de Cuentas de la Provincia de Buenos Aires.  
 
Table 13: Description of Variables in Junin 
 
Source: All data collected from the administrative records of the Municipality of Junín  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Jurisdiction Surface (km2) Population (2010)
Urbanization rate 
(2010)
School attendance 
(2001) (1)
GDP in thousands 
of PPP US$ (2003)
GDP p.c. in PPP 
US$ (2003)
GDP as percent of 
Buenos Aires 
(2003)
Junin 2,260 94,926 90.70% 92.60% 974,615 10,539 0.88%
Average Municipality 
(Buenos Aires) 
2,278 115,514 94.90% 91.90% 817,025 7,654 0.74%
Variable Description
Trash collection
Categorical variable equal to 0 if neither trash collection nor street cleaning services are 
provided; 1 if only trash collection services are provided; and 2 if trash collection and street 
cleaning services are both provided. 
Streetlights Number of streetlights around the properties associated to the taxpayer
Linear front meters Average linear front meters of all the properties associated to the taxpayer
Mean valuation of properties
Fiscal assesment of property value. Average for all the properties belonging to an individual 
taxpayers
Properties Number of registered properties associated to the taxpayer
Monthly payments Dummy = 1 if the taxpayer has at least one property for which the bill is paid monthly.
Tax liability Total amount billed to the taxpayer
Tax payment Total amount paid by the taxpayer in the period
Tax compliance ratio Tax payments over tax liabilities ratio (in percent)
Paid_by1D Dummy = 1 if the payment took place before the 1st due date
Paid_by2D Dummy = 1 if the payment took place before the 2nd due date
Paid Dummy = 1 only if the taxpayer has paid in full the total tax liabilities for the period 
Overpaid
Dummy = 1 if the taxpayer has paid not only her liabilities for the period in full but she has also 
made some additional payments
Additionalpayments
Dummy = 1 when the taxpayer has made advanced payments or paid down part of her debt, 
regardless of whether they have paid their current liabilities in full.
Debtor If taxpayer has at least one remaining unpaid bill
Debt stock Accumulated stock of debt
Unrecoverable Debtor Dummy=1 if the taxpayer did not pay any tax bill between 2007 and 2011
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Table 14: Messages included in the Tax Bill 
# Message Text of the message Image 
1 Deterrence Did you know that if you do not 
pay the CVP on time for a debt of 
AR$ 1,000 you will have to 
disburse AR$ 268 in arrears at the 
end of the year and the 
Municipality can take 
administrative and legal actions? 
 
2 Fairness In the first 6 months of this year, 
CVP’s collection contributed to 
place 28 new streetlights, water 
connections in 29 streets and 
sewerage networks in 21 blocks. 
 
3 Equity Did you know that only 30% of 
taxpayers do not pay the CVP? 
What about you?  
4  Control group No message/Image 
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Table 15: Baseline Summary Statistics and Balance of Randomization (Bim 3) 
 
Notes: Each row shows a regression of the pre-treatment variable in question on treatment dummies and a 
constant term. Observations are presented for the bi-monthly period prior to treatment (May-June). The constant 
captures the value for the control group (no message). Columns (2)-(4) show the difference between the treatment 
groups and the control group. Monetary amounts are in Argentine Pesos (AR$). Robust standard errors are in 
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
 
 
  
(1)
Control Group 
(2)
Difference:  
Deterrence 
(3)
Difference: 
Fairness
(4)
Difference: 
Equity
Trash collection 1.585*** -0.013 0.008 0.009
(0.004) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Streetlights 2.755*** -0.025 -0.012 -0.041
(0.010) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025)
Lineal front meters 15.629*** -0.393 -0.200 -0.018
(0.197) (0.519) (0.519) (0.518)
Mean valuation of properties 15,485.426*** 7.038 329.102 506.534
(182.102) (480.677) (481.076) (480.439)
Properties 1.395*** 0.015 -0.056 -0.040
(0.013) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035)
Monthly payments 0.010*** 0.002 0.006** -0.002
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Tax liability 121.612*** -0.320 -2.898 -3.070
(1.804) (4.762) (4.766) (4.760)
Tax payments 56.129*** 0.661 -1.404 -0.891
(1.081) (2.862) (2.864) (2.861)
Paid_by1D 0.213*** -0.011 0.014 -0.003
(0.003) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Paid_by2D 0.332*** -0.014 -0.003 -0.008
(0.004) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Paid 0.404*** -0.016 0.002 -0.004
(0.004) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Overpaid 0.031*** -0.002 -0.000 0.004
(0.001) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Addpay 0.045*** 0.002 -0.002 0.000
(0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Trash collection (Bim 5) 1.586*** -0.012 0.008 0.007
(0.004) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Streetlights (Bim 5) 2.752*** -0.026 -0.013 -0.037
(0.010) (0.025) (0.026) (0.025)
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Table 16: Average Treatment Effects  (Bim 5) 
 
Notes: Dependent variable used in each regression identified in the header. The first set of regressions (baseline) 
include the three treatment messages, the lagged outcome variable, and block-level fixed effects. The second set of 
regressions (controls) include also the variables for public service provision (trash collection and street lightning 
services during the period), the (log of the) number of properties that each taxpayer has, the (log of the) average 
linear front size of the properties, and a dummy that controls for those taxpayers who selected to pay monthly. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
Table 17: Average Treatment Effects  (Bim 5) – Taxpayers living outside the city 
 
Notes: Dependent variable used in each regression identified in the header. The first set of regressions (baseline) 
include the three treatment messages, the lagged outcome variable, and block-level fixed effects. The second set of 
regressions (controls) include also the variables for public service provision (trash collection and street lightning 
services during the period), the (log of the) number of properties that each taxpayer has, the (log of the) average 
linear front size of the properties, and a dummy that controls for those taxpayers who selected to pay monthly. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
VARIABLES
T1: Deterrence 0.017* 0.030** 0.047*** 0.007** 0.011*** 0.017* 0.031** 0.048*** 0.007* 0.010**
(0.010) (0.012) (0.015) (0.004) (0.004) (0.010) (0.012) (0.015) (0.004) (0.004)
T2: Fairness -0.005 -0.002 -0.001 -0.004 -0.004 -0.006 -0.004 -0.003 -0.004 -0.003
(0.010) (0.012) (0.015) (0.004) (0.004) (0.010) (0.013) (0.015) (0.004) (0.004)
T3: Equity 0.005 0.004 -0.009 0.002 0.006 0.004 0.004 -0.008 0.002 0.007
(0.010) (0.013) (0.015) (0.004) (0.004) (0.010) (0.013) (0.015) (0.004) (0.004)
Observations 23,195 23,195 23,176 23,073 23,211 23,186 23,186 23,168 23,065 23,081
Model Baseline Baseline Baseline Baseline Baseline Controls Controls Controls Controls Controls
Sample Whole Whole Whole Whole Whole Whole Whole Whole Whole Whole
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Paid Overpaid
Additional 
Payments
Paid_by1D Paid_by2D Paid OverPaid
Additional 
Payments
Paid_1D Paid_2D
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
VARIABLES
T1: Deterrence 0.034 0.115* 0.133* 0.008 0.033 0.042 0.127* 0.140* 0.005 0.031
(0.053) (0.063) (0.073) (0.037) (0.040) (0.054) (0.068) (0.074) (0.033) (0.040)
T2: Fairness 0.006 0.117* 0.149* 0.000 0.009 0.004 0.119* 0.136* 0.002 0.013
(0.055) (0.067) (0.078) (0.036) (0.041) (0.055) (0.068) (0.077) (0.033) (0.042)
T3: Equity 0.031 0.053 -0.031 0.030 0.051 0.025 0.050 -0.035 0.025 0.049
(0.052) (0.068) (0.087) (0.032) (0.036) (0.052) (0.065) (0.086) (0.029) (0.036)
Observations 471 471 470 469 476 468 468 467 466 467
Model Baseline Baseline Baseline Baseline Baseline Controls Controls Controls Controls Controls
Sample Whole Whole Whole Whole Whole Whole Whole Whole Whole Whole
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional 
Payments
Paid_1D Paid_2D Paid OverPaid
Additional 
Payments
Paid_1D Paid_2D Paid Overpaid
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Table 18:  Excluding Unrecoverable Debtors (Bim 5) 
 
Notes: Dependent variable used in each regression identified in the header. The first set of regressions (baseline) 
include the three treatment messages, the lagged outcome variable, and block-level fixed effects. The second set of 
regressions (controls) include also the variables for public service provision (trash collection and street lightning 
services during the period), the (log of the) number of properties that each taxpayer has, the (log of the) average 
linear front size of the properties, and a dummy that controls for those taxpayers who selected to pay monthly. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
VARIABLES
T1: Deterrence 0.022 0.038** 0.043*** 0.010* 0.015** 0.023 0.039** 0.044*** 0.009* 0.014**
(0.014) (0.016) (0.016) (0.005) (0.006) (0.014) (0.016) (0.016) (0.005) (0.006)
T2: Fairness -0.004 -0.002 0.001 -0.005 -0.006 -0.005 -0.004 -0.000 -0.005 -0.004
(0.014) (0.016) (0.016) (0.006) (0.006) (0.014) (0.016) (0.016) (0.006) (0.006)
T3: Equity 0.003 0.003 -0.017 0.002 0.009 0.002 0.002 -0.017 0.002 0.009
(0.014) (0.016) (0.016) (0.005) (0.006) (0.014) (0.016) (0.016) (0.005) (0.006)
Observations 15,845 15,845 15,831 15,794 15,915 15,837 15,837 15,823 15,786 15,800
Model Baseline Baseline Baseline Baseline Baseline Controls Controls Controls Controls Controls
Sample Non-defaulters Non-defaulters Non-defaulters Non-defaulters Non-defaulters Non-defaulters Non-defaulters Non-defaulters Non-defaulters Non-defaulters
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional 
Payments
Paid_1D Paid_2D Paid OverPaid
Additional 
Payments
Paid_1D Paid_2D Paid Overpaid
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Table 19: Balancing of the Sample Excluding Unrecoverable Debtors 
 
Notes: Each row shows a regression of the pre-treatment variable in question on treatment dummies and a constant 
term. Observations are presented for the bi-monthly period prior to treatment (May-June). The constant captures the 
value for the control group (no message). Columns (2)-(4) show the difference between the treatment groups and 
the control group. Monetary amounts are in Argentine Pesos (AR$). Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
 
  
(1)
Control Group 
(2)
Difference:  
Deterrence 
(3)
Difference: 
Fairness
(4)
Difference: 
Equity
Trash collection 1.667*** -0.006 0.011 0.000
(0.005) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Streetlights 2.866*** -0.012 -0.009 -0.050*
(0.011) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030)
Lineal front meters 14.447*** 0.178 -0.182 0.508
(0.174) (0.459) (0.458) (0.456)
Mean valuation of properties 17,409.872*** -31.546 -192.915 489.637
(199.751) (528.298) (526.250) (524.859)
Properties 1.445*** 0.013 -0.048 -0.045
(0.016) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043)
Monthly payments=1 0.003*** 0.001 -0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Tax liability 128.839*** 0.314 -0.869 -1.142
(1.766) (4.670) (4.652) (4.639)
Payment for current bim 77.044*** -0.488 -2.326 -2.133
(1.336) (3.546) (3.533) (3.524)
Paid 100% of the total tax liability before first expiration 0.303*** -0.018 0.013 -0.007
(0.004) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Paid 100% of the total tax liability before second expiration 0.471*** -0.021* -0.010 -0.015
(0.005) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Paid 0.571*** -0.022* -0.005 -0.013
(0.005) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Overpaid 0.045*** -0.004 -0.001 0.003
(0.002) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Addpay 0.063*** 0.003 -0.004 -0.002
(0.002) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Trash collection (Bim 5) 1.669*** -0.004 0.012 -0.002
(0.005) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Streetlights (Bim 5) 2.862*** -0.011 -0.008 -0.044
(0.012) (0.031) (0.030) (0.030)
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Figure 7. Tax liabilities, payments and compliance ratio (AR$ millions 
and percent), 2007-2011 
 
Source: own elaboration based on administrative information provided by the Municipality of Junín. 
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Figure 8. Interaction effects of the treatments with the lagged 
dependent variable.  
 
Figure 8a. Marginal effect of deterrence message 
according to past payment behavior 
Figure 8b. Marginal effect of equity message 
according to past payment behavior 
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Figure 9. Interaction effects of the treatments with having debts  
 
Figure 9a. Marginal effect of deterrence message 
according to having debts or not 
Figure 9b. Marginal effect of equity message 
according to having debts or not 
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Figure 10. Interaction effects of the equity message with debt stock  
 
 
 
 
Figure 11. Interaction effects of the message with size of the property  
Figure 10a. Marginal effect of deterrence message 
according to property size 
Figure 10b. Marginal effect of fairness message 
according to property size 
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Figure 12. Tax Compliance by Treatment Groups and Control Group (in 
percent)  (Bim 5) 
  
Notes: This figure plots the tax compliance ratio (tax payments over tax liabilities) for the treatment groups and 
the control. It also displays –in a solid line- the average tax compliance ratio prior to the experiment (Period 3 – 
May-June) as well as –in a dotted line- the average tax compliance ratio in the same period 5 (September-
October) but one year before (2010). The difference in compliance between the group that received the 
deterrence message and the control is statistically significant at the 1% level according to a proportions test. 
Differences are not statistically significant for the other two groups. 
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Table 20. Socioeconomic characteristics of 9 de Julio and the “average” 
municipality in the province of Buenos Aires 
 
Notes:  School attendance is the percentage of the population between 5 and 18 years old, attending any type of school. 
Sources: own elaboration based on Ministry of Interior of Argentina, National Censuses of 2001 and 2010, Provincial Bureau of 
Statistics and Tribunal de Cuentas de la Provincia de Buenos Aires. 
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Table 21. Description of variables in 9 de Julio 
Variable Description 
Paid total tax bill Dummy = 1 if the taxpayer has not only paid in full the total tax liabilities for the 
period but she has also made some additional payments 
Local public services First principal component of the public services provided by the municipality of 9 
de Julio (e.g. streetlights, street cleaning and paved roads) 
Surface Average square meters of all properties associated to the taxpayer  
Linear front meters  Average linear front meters of all the properties associated to the taxpayer  
Properties  Number of registered properties associated to the taxpayer  
Tax liability  Total amount billed to the taxpayer in August 2012  
Tax payments Total amount paid by the taxpayer in the period 
Tax compliance ratio Tax payments over tax liabilities ratio (in percent) 
Debtor Dummy =1 if the taxpayer has at least one remaining unpaid bill 
Debt stock Accumulated stock of debt 
Unrecoverable Debtor  Dummy=1 if the taxpayer did not pay any tax bill between 2010 and January, 2012   
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Table 22. Messages included in the Tax Bill in 9 de Julio 
# Message Text of the message Images 
1 Deterrence Did you know that if you do not 
pay on time the TRSU for a debt 
of, for example, 1,000 pesos you 
will have to pay 269 additional 
pesos in arrears by the end of the 
year, and we can take 
administrative actions? 
 
2 Monitoring I wanted to communicate you that 
from the Office of Public Revenues 
of 9 de Julio we are monitoring 
more closely compliance and 
payment delays with the TRSU. 
 
3 Interaction Deterrence message 
 + Monitoring letter 
  
4 Placebo 
message 
A clean city is the least soiled. 
Collaborate, keep clean 9 de Julio 
No image 
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Table 23. Baseline Summary Statistics and Balance of Randomization 
in Pre-experimental Period 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Control Group Difference: 
Deterrence 
Difference: 
Deterrence + 
Detection 
Difference: 
Detection 
Paid total tax bill 0.651*** -0.001 0.007 -0.001 
 (0.007) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
Log (Tax payments) 4.283*** -0.004 -0.001 0.015 
 (0.016) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) 
Log (Tax liabilities) 4.390*** 0.006 -0.008 0.004 
 (0.010) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
Log (Number of 
properties) 
0.845*** -0.002 -0.006 -0.000 
 (0.005) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Paved roads 
(August) 
0.993*** -0.001 -0.000 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Streetlights 
(August) 
0.857*** -0.006 -0.007 -0.012 
 (0.005) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Street cleaning 
(August) 
0.662*** 0.010 0.012 0.015 
 (0.007) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Debtor 0.484*** 0.004 -0.009 -0.001 
 (0.008) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
Notes: Each row shows a regression of the pre-treatment variable in question on treatment dummies and a constant 
term. Observations are presented for the average six-month period prior to treatment (August 2011-January 2012). 
The constant captures the average value for the control group (no message).. Robust standard errors are in 
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Table 24. Average Treatment Effects of Receiving a Message and/or a 
Letter (August) 
 (1) (2) 
   
T0: Taxpayer received a message/letter 0.029*** 0.035** 
 (0.011) (0.015) 
Lagged outcome  0.449*** 
  (0.044) 
Local public services  0.001 
  (0.004) 
Log (Number of properties)  -0.010*** 
  (0.001) 
Fixed effects Yes Yes 
Observations 10,343 10,165 
Notes: Regressions using a linear probability model of the probability of paying 100% or more of total tax liabilities in the 
August billing period. Colum (1) includes the three treatment messages, the lagged outcome variable, and block-level fixed 
effects. Colum (2) includes the principal component of the variables for public service provision (street cleaning, street 
lightning and paved roads services during the period),  and the (log of the) number of properties that each taxpayer has.  
Robust standard errors in parentheses. .*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 25. Average Effects of the Treatment Messages (August) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
         
T1: 
Deterren
ce 
Message 
0.039** 0.041** 0.045** 0.049*** 0.048*** 0.044*** 0.049*** 0.048*** 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) 
T2: T1 x 
T3 
0.022 0.025 0.025 0.030* 0.030* 0.016 0.020 0.020 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) 
T3: 
Detectio
n Letter 
0.034** 0.035** 0.030* 0.031* 0.032* 0.035** 0.030* 0.030* 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) 
Observat
ions 
10,230 10,230 10,225 10,225 10,225 8,674 8,670 8,670 
Model Baseline Baseline Controls Controls Controls Baseline Controls Controls 
Sample Whole Whole Whole Whole Whole Non-
defaulter
s 
Non-
defaulter
s 
Non-
defaulter
s 
Fix 
effects 
No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: Regressions using a probit model of the probability of paying 100% or more of tax liabilities in the August 
billing period. The first set of regressions (baseline) include the three treatment messages, the lagged outcome 
variable, and block-level fixed effects. The second set of regressions (controls) include also the principal 
component of the variables for public service provision (trash collection, paved roads and street lightning services 
during the period), the (log of the) number of properties that each taxpayer has, and the (log of the) average tax 
liability. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 26. Baseline Summary Statistics and Balance of Randomization in 
Pre-experimental Period, Excluding Unrecoverable Debtors 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Control Group 
Difference: 
Deterrence 
Difference: 
Deterrence + 
Detection 
Difference: 
Detection 
Paid total tax bill 0.593*** 0.010 0.000 0.000 
 (0.008) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Log (Tax 
payments) 
4.283*** -0.003 0.000 0.013 
 (0.015) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) 
Log (Tax 
liabilities) 
4.435*** 0.014 -0.022 -0.002 
 (0.012) (0.021) (0.020) (0.020) 
Log (Surface) 5.594*** 0.017 0.005 0.012 
 (0.020) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) 
Log (number of 
properties) 
0.865*** 0.000 -0.012 -0.003 
 (0.006) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Paved roads 0.994*** -0.001 -0.001 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Streetlights 0.854*** -0.007 -0.007 -0.012 
 (0.005) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Street cleaning 0.700*** 0.018 0.014 0.018 
 (0.007) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Debtor 0.395*** -0.007 -0.008 -0.007 
 (0.008) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
Notes: Each row shows a regression of the pre-treatment variable in question on treatment dummies and a constant 
term. Observations are presented for the average six-month period prior to treatment (August 2011-Janurary 2012), 
excluding unrecoverable debtors. The constant captures the average value for the control group (no message). 
Monetary amounts are in Argentine Pesos (AR$). Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, 
* p<0.1.  
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Table 27. Treatment Effects by Strata (August) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 One property, non-
complier 
One property, 
complier 
Multiple properties, 
non-complier 
Multiple properties, 
complier 
     
T1: Deterrence 
Message 
0.037* 0.018 0.058* 0.032 
 (0.022) (0.015) (0.030) (0.035) 
T2: T1 X T3 0.047** 0.009 0.031 -0.018 
 (0.023) (0.016) (0.029) (0.037) 
T3: Detection Letter 0.056** 0.004 0.061** -0.029 
 (0.023) (0.016) (0.030) (0.036) 
Observations 3,215 4,180 1,664 1,111 
Model Controls Controls Controls Controls 
Sample Whole Whole Whole Whole 
Fix effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: Regressions using a probit model of the probability of paying 100% or more of tax liabilities in the August 
billing period. All the regressions include the three treatment messages, the lagged outcome variable, and block-level 
fixed effects, the variables for public service provision (trash collection, paved roads and street lightning services during 
the period), the (log of the) number of properties that each taxpayer has, the (log of the) average linear front size of the 
properties, and a dummy that controls for those taxpayers who selected to be in a repayment plan. 
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Figure 13. Tax liabilities, payments and compliance ratio (AR$ millions 
and percent), 2010-2012 
 
Source: own elaboration based on administrative information provided by the Municipality of 9 de Julio 
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Figure 14. Tax Compliance by Treatment Groups and Control Group (in 
percent) (August) 
 
Notes: This figure plots the tax compliance ratio (tax payments over tax liabilities) for the treatment 
groups and the control. It also displays –in a solid line- the average tax compliance ratio prior to the 
experiment (January 2012) as well as –in a dotted line- the average tax compliance ratio in the same 
period  (August) but one year before (2011). The difference in compliance between the group that 
received the deterrence message and the control is statistically significant at the 1% level according to a 
proportions test. Differences are not statistically significant for the other two groups. 
Source: own elaboration based on administrative information provided by the Municipality of 9 de Julio 
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Appendix 2.  Additional regressions and figures 
 
Table 1: Robustness check - Impacts of price increase in bill 0 on consumption in period 1 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Treatment 
-15.901** 
(6.491) 
-17.415*** 
(6.342) 
-15.266** 
(5.929) 
-16.637*** 
(5.656) 
-15.577** 
(6.153) 
-17.013*** 
(5.934) 
-15.597* 
(9.194) 
-16.670* 
(8.996) 
-16.296* 
(8.105) 
-18.000** 
(7.922) 
-14.780** 
(6.882) 
-16.371** 
(6.583) 
            
AAC 
0.720** 
(0.290) 
0.822*** 
(0.272) 
1.004** 
(0.412) 
1.169*** 
(0.368) 
0.707** 
(0.272) 
0.806*** 
(0.251) 
2.201 
(1.441) 
2.547* 
(1.282) 
0.759 
(0.451) 
0.876* 
(0.450) 
1.443** 
(0.612) 
1.603** 
(0.604) 
            
AAC * 
Treatment 
  
-0.619 
(0.531) 
-0.753 
(0.493) 
 
 
 
-2.777 
(1.968) 
-3.335* 
(1.823) 
  -1.522* 
(0.782) 
-1.620** 
(0.783) 
            
AAC2     
-0.011 
(0.012) 
-0.013 
(0.011) 
0.059 
(0.069) 
0.068 
(0.061) 
    
            
AAC2 * 
Treatment 
      
-0.014 
(0.090) 
-0.011 
(0.086) 
    
             
Constant 
433.271*** 
(3.299) 
461.555*** 
(33.802) 
436.134*** 
(3.992) 
464.847*** 
(33.767) 
434.620*** 
(3.539) 
463.133*** 
(33.715) 
439.962*** 
(6.161) 
468.975*** 
(35.078) 
433.000*** 
(4.042) 
465.119*** 
(43.858) 
438.133*** 
(4.647) 
470.180*** 
(44.095) 
            
Bandwidth 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 15 15 15 15 
             
Areas 
Effects 
N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y 
             
N 7190 7190 7190 7190 7190 7190 7190 7190 5417 5417 5417 5417 
             
R-squared 0.001 0.056 0.001 0.056 0.001 0.056 0.001 0.057 0.001 0.057 0.001 0.058 
Notes: The dependent variable is consumption in Period 1. The bandwidths determine the range of normalized annual accumulated consumption used to select observations for a particular 
regression. For example, in Columns (1) and (2) only individuals with normalized annual accumulated consumption between [-20, 20] are included. Average of the dependent variable is 425.49. 
The estimation method is OLS. Standard errors clustered by accumulated consumption in Period 0. Even columns present regressions with areas (neighborhoods) dummies. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, 
* p<0.1. 
 Table 2. Dependent variable Paid_by1D - Junin 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES Paid_by1D Paid_by1D Paid_by1D Paid_by1D Paid_by1D Paid_by1D Paid_by1D Paid_by1D
T1: Deterrence 0.017* 0.017* 0.017* 0.017* 0.017* 0.022 0.023 0.023
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
T2: Fairness -0.004 -0.005 -0.006 -0.006 -0.005 -0.004 -0.005 -0.004
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
T3: Equity 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.002 0.002
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Paid_by1D (t-1) 0.600*** 0.563*** 0.562*** 0.550*** 0.549*** 0.614*** 0.601*** 0.599***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Streetlights 0.015*** 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.000
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Trash Collection 0.120*** 0.096*** 0.100*** 0.101*** 0.116***
(0.007) (0.009) (0.009) (0.013) (0.013)
Monthly payments 0.038 0.028 0.029 -0.051 -0.048
(0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.081) (0.082)
Log(Number of Properties) -0.036*** -0.062*** -0.047*** -0.143*** -0.075***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.015) (0.016) (0.024)
Log(Lineal Front Meters) -0.036*** -0.018** -0.011 -0.022* 0.010
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.012) (0.015)
Log(Tax Liability) -0.010 -0.042***
(0.006) (0.011)
Observations 23,195 23,195 23,186 23,186 23,186 15,845 15,837 15,837
Model Baseline Baseline Controls Controls Controls Baseline Controls Controls
Sample Whole Whole Whole Whole Whole Non-defaulters Non-defaulters Whole
Fix effects No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3. Dependent variable Paid_by2D - Junin 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES Paid_by2D Paid_by2D Paid_by2D Paid_by2D Paid_by2D Paid_by2D Paid_by2D Paid_by2D
T1: Deterrence 0.031** 0.030** 0.031** 0.031** 0.031** 0.038** 0.039** 0.039**
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
T2: Fairness -0.002 -0.002 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.002 -0.004 -0.003
(0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
T3: Equity 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.002 0.002
(0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Paid_by2D (t-1) 0.840*** 0.809*** 0.809*** 0.797*** 0.797*** 0.806*** 0.794*** 0.792***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Streetlights 0.014*** 0.008* 0.008 0.008 0.007
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
Trash Collection 0.092*** 0.081*** 0.088*** 0.079*** 0.101***
(0.009) (0.011) (0.012) (0.015) (0.016)
Monthly payments 0.108*** 0.104*** 0.105*** 0.213*** 0.218***
(0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.082) (0.083)
Log(Number of Properties) -0.050*** -0.070*** -0.034* -0.157*** -0.053**
(0.015) (0.015) (0.019) (0.017) (0.027)
Log(Lineal Front Meters) -0.030*** -0.021** -0.005 -0.029** 0.020
(0.009) (0.010) (0.011) (0.013) (0.016)
Log(Tax Liability) -0.023*** -0.064***
(0.008) (0.013)
Observations 23,195 23,195 23,186 23,186 23,186 15,845 15,837 15,837
Model Baseline Baseline Controls Controls Controls Baseline Controls Controls
Sample Whole Whole Whole Whole Whole Non-defaulters Non-defaulters Whole
Fix effects No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.  Dependent variable Paid - Junin 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES Paid Paid Paid Paid Paid Paid Paid Paid
T1: Deterrence 0.046*** 0.047*** 0.047*** 0.048*** 0.047*** 0.043*** 0.044*** 0.044***
(0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
T2: Fairness -0.000 -0.001 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 0.001 -0.000 0.001
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
T3: Equity -0.009 -0.009 -0.008 -0.008 -0.009 -0.017 -0.017 -0.016
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Paid (t-1) 1.041*** 1.011*** 1.014*** 1.001*** 1.007*** 0.876*** 0.864*** 0.861***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Streetlights 0.010** 0.003 0.003 0.000 -0.000
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
Trash Collection 0.092*** 0.071*** 0.058*** 0.064*** 0.080***
(0.011) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.016)
Monthly payments 0.159*** 0.153*** 0.150*** 0.339*** 0.341***
(0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.087) (0.086)
Log(Number of Properties) -0.033* -0.061*** -0.121*** -0.136*** -0.066**
(0.017) (0.018) (0.024) (0.017) (0.030)
Log(Lineal Front Meters) -0.039*** -0.028** -0.053*** -0.022* 0.013
(0.010) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.018)
Log(Tax Liability) 0.039*** -0.045***
(0.010) (0.016)
Observations 23,176 23,176 23,168 23,168 23,168 15,831 15,823 15,823
Model Baseline Baseline Controls Controls Controls Baseline Controls Controls
Sample Whole Whole Whole Whole Whole Non-defaulters Non-defaulters Whole
Fix effects No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5. Dependent variable Overpaid - Junin 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES Overpaid Overpaid Overpaid Overpaid Overpaid Overpaid Overpaid Overpaid
T1: Deterrence 0.007* 0.007** 0.007* 0.007* 0.007* 0.010* 0.009* 0.009*
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
T2: Fairness -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.003 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
T3: Equity 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Overpaid (t-1) 0.035*** 0.032*** 0.032*** 0.031*** 0.031*** 0.031*** 0.031*** 0.031***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Streetlights 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Trash Collection 0.008*** 0.007** 0.009*** -0.000 0.005
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005)
Monthly payments 0.011 0.010 0.011 0.030 0.032
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.026) (0.026)
Log(Number of Properties) -0.003 -0.005 0.005 -0.015** 0.009
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.009)
Log(Lineal Front Meters) -0.014*** -0.015*** -0.010*** -0.025*** -0.013**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006)
Log(Tax Liability) -0.006*** -0.015***
(0.002) (0.004)
Observations 23,174 23,073 23,166 23,065 23,065 15,794 15,786 15,786
Model Baseline Baseline Controls Controls Controls Baseline Controls Controls
Sample Whole Whole Whole Whole Whole Non-defaulters Non-defaulters Whole
Fix effects No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6. Dependent variable Additionalpayments - Junin 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES
Additional 
Payments
Additional 
Payments
Additional 
Payments
Additional 
Payments
Additional 
Payments
Additional 
Payments
Additional 
Payments
Additional 
Payments
T1: Deterrence 0.011** 0.011*** 0.010** 0.010** 0.010** 0.015** 0.014** 0.014**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
T2: Fairness -0.004 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.006 -0.004 -0.004
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
T3: Equity 0.007 0.006 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.009 0.009 0.009
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Additional Payments (t-1) 0.061*** 0.056*** 0.054*** 0.053*** 0.053*** 0.060*** 0.058*** 0.058***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Streetlights 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Trash Collection 0.008** 0.004 0.006 -0.006 -0.001
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006)
Monthly payments 0.019* 0.019* 0.019* 0.037 0.038
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.026) (0.026)
Log(Number of Properties) 0.029*** 0.026*** 0.033*** 0.029*** 0.050***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.010)
Log(Lineal Front Meters) -0.013*** -0.012*** -0.009** -0.019*** -0.009
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.007)
Log(Tax Liability) -0.004* -0.013***
(0.003) (0.005)
Observations 23,313 23,211 23,182 23,081 23,081 15,915 15,800 15,800
Model Baseline Baseline Controls Controls Controls Baseline Controls Controls
Sample Whole Whole Whole Whole Whole Non-defaulters Non-defaulters Whole
Fix effects No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Marginal effects for T1 at different levels of covariates – Junin 
Figure 1a. Marginal effects for deterrence at 
different levels of trash collection 
Figure 1b. Marginal effects for deterrence at 
different property sizes 
  
 
Figure 1c. Marginal effects for deterrence at 
different number of properties 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7. Probit regressions. Interaction models. Junin. 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Paid Paid Paid Paid
T1: Deterrence 0.152*** 0.069 0.066 0.497**
(0.047) (0.060) (0.109) (0.197)
T2: Fairness 0.028 -0.019 -0.061 0.431**
(0.050) (0.058) (0.098) (0.201)
T3: Equity 0.059 -0.149*** -0.297*** -0.079
(0.049) (0.055) (0.087) (0.205)
Paid (t-1) 2.667*** 1.355*** 0.853*** 2.629***
(0.030) (0.047) (0.051) (0.025)
Streetlights 0.008 -0.001 0.028** 0.009
(0.014) (0.015) (0.013) (0.014)
Trash Collection 0.187*** 0.165*** 0.165*** 0.185***
(0.034) (0.036) (0.035) (0.034)
Monthly payments 0.404*** 1.241*** 0.974*** 0.402***
(0.139) (0.092) (0.098) (0.139)
Log(Number of Properties) -0.159*** -0.135*** 0.032 -0.159***
(0.046) (0.048) (0.053) (0.046)
Log (Lineal Front Meters) -0.074** -0.018 -0.045
(0.030) (0.031) (0.034)
Debtor -1.543*** -1.321***
(0.051) (0.049)
Debtor Stock -0.173***
(0.008)
T1: Deterrence x paid(t-1) -0.066
(0.080)
T2: Fairness x paid(t-1) -0.086
(0.078)
T3: Equity x paid(t-1) -0.187**
(0.076)
T1: Deterrence x debtor 0.093
(0.079)
T2: Fairness x debtor 0.034
(0.081)
T3: Equity x debtor 0.242***
(0.077)
T1: Deterrence x debt stock 0.010
(0.018)
T2: Fairness x debt stock 0.012
(0.016)
T3: Equity x debt stock 0.054***
(0.015)
T1: Deterrence x meters -0.144*
(0.074)
T2: Fairness x meters -0.170**
(0.076)
T3: Equity x meters 0.022
(0.078)
Constant -1.220*** 0.055 0.865*** -1.265***
(0.199) (0.217) (0.198) (0.202)
Observations 23,168 23,168 23,168 23,168
Interaction Lagged Dep. Var. Debtor Debt Stock Linear Front Meters
Model Controls Controls Controls Controls
Sample Whole Whole Whole Whole
Fix effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8. Average treatment effects for the whole sample and non-defaulters in 
August -  9 de Julio 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
         
T1: Deterrence 
Message 
0.039** 0.041** 0.045** 0.049*** 0.048*** 0.044*** 0.049*** 0.048*** 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) 
T2: T1 x T3 0.022 0.025 0.025 0.030* 0.030* 0.016 0.020 0.020 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) 
T3: Detection 
Letter 
0.034** 0.035** 0.030* 0.031* 0.032* 0.035** 0.030* 0.030* 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) 
Lagged outcome 0.759*** 0.545*** 0.612*** 0.466*** 0.463*** 0.402*** 0.342*** 0.344*** 
 (0.013) (0.016) (0.015) (0.018) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) 
Locally provided 
services 
  0.283*** 0.272*** 0.274***  0.248*** 0.249*** 
   (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)  (0.015) (0.016) 
Log(Number of 
Properties) 
  -
0.069*** 
-0.007 -
0.121*** 
 -0.016 -0.095** 
   (0.023) (0.038) (0.045)  (0.033) (0.040) 
Log(Tax 
Liability) 
    0.076***   0.054*** 
     (0.015)   (0.013) 
         
Observations 10,230 10,230 10,225 10,225 10,225 8,674 8,670 8,670 
Model Baseline Baseline Controls Controls Controls Baseline Controls Controls 
Sample Whole Whole Whole Whole Whole Non-
defaulters 
Non-
defaulters 
Non-
defaulters 
Fix effects No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 3. Maps 
 
Map 1. Locational map of Junín within the Province of Buenos Aires 
 
 
Source: http://www.junin.gov.ar/archivos/mapas.html 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Map 2. Map of Junín by District 
 
Note: this figure presents the map of the 15 administrative districts in which Junín is divided. District I represents the largest 
district and capital of the municipality, the city of Junín. Names of adjoining municipalities are also display in caps.  
Source: http://www.junin.gov.ar/archivos/mapas.html 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Map 3. A closer look into some of the districts of Junin 
 
Source: http://www.junin.gov.ar/archivos/mapas.html 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Map 4. Locational map of 9 de Julio within the Province of Buenos Aires 
 
Notes: the map shows 9 de Julio (in grey) and its surrounding districts in the province of Buenos Aires. The arrows point to 
the direction of the three largest cities of Argentina: City of Buenos Aires (CABA by its acronym in Spanish), Córdoba and 
Rosario. 
Source: own elaboration based on maps provided by the Municipality of 9 de Julio.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 4. Sample Tax Bills with Treatment Messages (in 
Spanish) 
 
Image 1. Sample Tax Bill – Deterrence Treatment - Junin 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Image 2. Sample Tax Bill – Fairness Treatment - Junin 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Image 3. Sample Tax Bill – Equity Treatment - Junin 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Image 4. Sample Deterrence Message – 9 de Julio 
 
 
English Translation 
IMPORTANT 
Did you know that if you do not pay on time the TRSU for a debt of, for example, 1,000 pesos you 
will have to pay 269 additional pesos in arrears by the end of the year, and we can take 
administrative actions? 
Accountant Albertina Enriquez 
Under-secretary of Revenue and Control 
Municipality of 9 de Julio 
Important: the TRSU bill is attached. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Image 5. Sample Monitoring Letter (in Spanish) – 9 de Julio 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
English Translation 
Notification 
We are monitoring compliance with the TRSU 
Name: 
Property: 
Address: 
Town/City: 
Zip code:  
Dear Mr/Ms/Miss 
 
I want to communicate you that from the Office of Public Revenues of 9 de Julio we are monitoring 
more closely compliance and payment delays with the TRSU.  
We look forward your cooperation. 
Best regards, 
Accountant Albertina Enriquez 
Under-secretary of Revenue and Control 
Municipality of 9 de Julio 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Image 7. Sample Placebo Message – 9 de Julio  
 
English Translation 
A clean city is the least soiled. Collaborate, keep clean 9 de Julio 
Important: the TRSU bill is attached. 
 
 
